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IIED WoRKINg PAPER
This working paper explores how countries can 
enhance their ‘climate finance readiness’ by 
understanding their internal political economy. 
Studies in three countries reveal how actors’ 
various ideas and incentives influence their 
choices and decisions on climate finance projects. 
Understanding how these factors interact — 
understanding the political economy — can help 
policymakers manage expectations and stakeholder 
risks early on, prioritise equitable climate finance 
investments and fashion a consensus from 
divergent ideas.
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This working paper explores how countries can build 
their own ‘climate finance readiness’ by understanding 
their internal political economy and use that 
understanding to steer consensus-based decisions 
on climate finance investments. For climate finance 
to be effective, national leaders must build shared 
commitments. This involves considering the arguments, 
incentives and power dynamics at play to ensure 
priorities are more equitable and representative of a 
broader group of stakeholders. Doing so will also help 
to reduce the risk of implementation delays. 
This paper uses case studies from Bangladesh, Ethiopia 
and Nepal to explore how narratives and incentives 
within the political economy drive climate investment 
outcomes under the Pilot Programme for Climate 
Resilience (PPCR) and the Scaling up Renewable 
Energy Programme (SREP). It draws from broader 
analysis of the discourses around these investments, 
including 80 interviews with government; multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) and other stakeholders. 
Interview questions aimed to understand actors’ 
narratives and their interpretations of the core objectives 
of climate funds, such as how the funds will: 
• Bring transformational change
• Engage the private sector
• Ensure development impacts
• Build country ownership, and 
• Scale up investments. 
The cases featured in this paper examine interactions 
between narratives and decision outcomes on how they 
have institutionalised the programmes, how they have 
prioritised investment decisions, and how they have 
selected funding instruments. These cases highlight 
common patterns of ideas and point to some pitfalls 
that decision makers should avoid when navigating the 
climate finance process.
Three key findings
1. Actors with shared ideas, narratives 
and resources form coalitions in support 
of investment decisions
Stakeholders involved in planning the PPCR and 
SREP investments coalesced into groups that shared 
a vision towards ‘transformational change’ and bringing 
‘development benefits’. These coalitions had the power 
to direct investment decisions. 
For example, our discourse analysis in Bangladesh 
showed that government implementing entities and 
MDBs shared the narrative that PPCR would bring 
‘transformation’ by investing in capacities for climate 
resilient infrastructure, and that ‘development benefits’ 
would be achieved through economic growth. This 
coalition steered decisions to invest PPCR finance into 
large-scale coastal engineering projects. 
In Ethiopia, there was strong agreement between 
the government and MDBs that diversifying energy 
technologies would be a transformative move that would 
lead to and drive economic growth. This led decision 
makers to prioritise grid-based geothermal and wind 
energy projects.
2. Incentives can strengthen the 
coalitions that support decisions
Incentives, which can include policy, economic 
(resources) and knowledge-based factors, can 
strengthen coalitions and shape national decisions on 
climate finance.
In Bangladesh (under the PPCR), there were clear 
resources and economic incentives to support large-
scale infrastructure investments. The MDBs and the line 
departments that would plan and manage the projects 
had previously worked together on other infrastructure 
initiatives, and this track record encouraged the 
government to use PPCR money for similar purposes. 
Co-finance was available for existing coastal 
Executive summary
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infrastructure projects already in the pipeline that 
required top up funding. Bangladesh’s climate change 
strategy and National Adaptation Programme of Action 
(NAPA) supported taking these initiatives forward. 
There was also a strong knowledge incentive: climate 
change vulnerability assessments, including evaluations 
of loss and damage from Cyclone Sidr in 2007, call for 
US$1.2 billion to rehabilitate coastal embankments. 
The contrasting investment decisions made in Ethiopia 
and Nepal (under SREP) were guided by the different 
economic incentives they faced, as well as the policy 
goals and knowledge available to each. Ethiopia’s grid-
based approach aligned well with available co-finance 
for renewable energy and its national development 
plans that promote a fast-growing grid and extra energy 
for export. Ethiopia’s growth and Transformation Plan 
2009 provides a clear policy incentive to scale up 
energy production for export. Further, policymakers 
know that climate variability is already affecting existing 
energy sources (such as hydropower), giving them a 
knowledge incentive to diversify technologies. These 
incentives have jointly steered Ethiopia to invest in large-
scale grid-based electricity.
Nepal’s government stakeholders saw the economic 
benefits in funding proven, commercially viable 
technologies and providing power for the rural economy. 
Nepal’s high-level plans aim at expanding rural energy 
access, predominantly through building on existing 
national arrangements that focus on hydropower, at 
least in the earlier versions of the plan. Very recently, 
however, funding partners have sought to encourage 
the private sector to move into novel technologies, 
particularly solar. Supplementing this are projects co-
financed by multilaterals that invest in piloting waste-to-
energy and hybrid solar-wind technologies in Nepal.
3. Dispersed narratives and resources 
have less influence on decisions, but can 
undermine implementation
Despite the accord at high levels, there were also 
less mainstream views. Stakeholders on the margins 
of the consensus argued for alternative ways of 
achieving objectives but these ideas failed to translate 
into investments. 
For example, in Bangladesh a wide range of actors 
were sceptical about whether the PPCR investments 
would bring about transformational change. Some saw 
more coastal engineering as just ‘business as usual’. 
others believed development benefits would be better 
achieved by investing in community-based adaptation or 
social innovations. 
In Bangladesh stakeholders who championed 
social innovation never gained a firm foothold. Even 
though these champions came from a wide range of 
departments and institutions, they were not well linked 
through existing relationships and resources, and the 
lack of a coalition diluted their influence. Similarly, the 
widely scattered scepticism about whether PPCR 
could truly bring about a transformation in Bangladesh 
had little effect on decision making. Similarly in Nepal, 
stakeholders on the fringe who called for more attention 
to infrastructure development, growth and employment 
remained there.
But even if they do not sway the policy consensus, 
dissenters are often in a position to deter the 
implementation of projects they disagree with. In both 
Bangladesh and Nepal, delays arose when the views of 
the agricultural ministries and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC)1 differed over the appropriate role 
of the private sector. The PPCR asks governments to 
fund the removal of barriers to private-sector investment 
in adaptation-related activities, but agriculture officials 
have been reluctant to spend public funds to incentivise 
profit-oriented businesses. The governments argue 
that the private sector has few capabilities beyond the 
marketing of inputs like seeds, fertilisers and pesticides 
and that government department have better outreach. 
In Ethiopia divergent views and incentives have also 
delayed implementation of investment decisions, at 
times threatening effective project delivery. 
Conclusions and 
recommendations:
Below we share specific lessons from national 
experiences of governing CIFs as well as the wider 
learnings gained through the political economy analysis. 
Lessons from national experiences:
From national institutionalisation and governance 
of CIFs
• Seeking investment proposals from those at the 
fringe of decision making could help steer countries 
towards transformational change. Achieving this may 
require new incentives and avenues for engagement 
as well as increasing capacities in developing 
project pipelines. 
• Extending ‘country ownership’ beyond a few lead 
national actors, perhaps by replacing information 
dissemination with true dialogue, could help build 
understanding, integrate divergent views and foster 
a broader consensus on how to use international 
climate finance.
1 The IFC is the MDB that implements the private sector investment projects of both PPCR and SREP
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• Institutional coordination and consensus is the 
core of effective implementation. Leaving dissenting 
views unacknowledged and unaddressed can allow 
conflict and competition to persist beyond investment 
planning therefore hindering implementation.
From investment planning under CIFs
• Some preparatory element is vital to define roles 
and responsibilities and to manage expectations, 
remove information asymmetries and establish an 
extended dialogue that will ensure stakeholder 
engagement. However, the extent of planning 
(whether detailed or basic) should be a country’s 
own decision. 
• Investment plans should actively seek opportunities 
for transformational projects, and in particular, guard 
against perverse incentives that support short-termism 
or only engender business as usual approaches.
• Countries should prepare thoroughly in order 
to address the challenges frequently observed 
when attempting to engage the private sector in 
climate finance investments. Clarity about who is 
expected to invest, and how, would help overcome 
barriers. International financial intermediaries 
should be encouraged to work in coordination with 
governments, rather than alongside them, especially 
in ‘developmental state’2 economies where the private 
sector is deeply regulated by government.
Lessons from understanding the 
political economy
our political economy analysis revealed that like-
minded coalitions support symbiotic decision making, 
while alternative coalitions with limited resources and 
dispersed knowledge are pushed to the margins. The 
case studies in this report offer policymakers insight 
into how countries can build their own ‘climate finance 
readiness’ by understanding their internal political 
economy and using that understanding to steer effective 
decision making on climate finance investments. 
• Consider the context of narratives and 
incentives. Each proposal for climate-resilient 
development will have proponents and dissenters 
driven by ideologies, incentives and resources. 
Policymakers will need to be bold and find pathways 
to successfully navigate the political economy at hand, 
often by reshaping incentives. 
• Be purposeful with the process. Decision makers 
can develop more effective policies by actively 
seeking out and integrating more diverse views. 
Ensuring line ministries are engaged in decisions 
that directly affect them will increase ownership and 
cooperation during implementation. 
• Recognise patterns of coalition and dissent.
Where actors share a vision, channelling resources 
in that direction can generate synergistic actions. 
If an alternative view exists at the margins, seek 
policy or economic incentives for integrating it 
into the consensus. Look for dissent that may 
pose future obstacles in order to negotiate and 
manage expectations.
This working paper draws on a broader research 
project on Political Economy of Climate Investment 
Funds. For more information see: http://www.iied.org/
understanding-political-economy-climate-investment-
funds
2 ‘Developmental state’ economies are state based economies where economic development and markets are strongly governed and steered by the 
public sector. 
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1 
Introduction 
Funds aimed at helping developing countries respond 
to climate change have multiplied over the past decade 
and the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) are just one 
of many multilateral channels. The US$10 billion 
committed to the green Climate Fund (gCF) further 
contributes to the US$100 billion expected from 
developed countries annually under the Copenhagen 
accord of 2009, although both CIF and gCF 
arrangements remain delinked. 
Adequate finance is important, but so is ensuring that 
country systems for policy, planning and budgeting 
are ready to access, govern and deliver climate funds. 
Country ‘readiness’3 to plan for and put climate funds 
into action is shaped by each country’s political 
economy: the ways in which various actors work 
with ideas, power and resources to develop and 
implement policy. 
The rise of climate finance initiatives is reshaping 
the political landscape in developing countries. New 
incentives and governance structures have reshuffled 
priorities and power (Tanner and Allouche, 2011). 
Within countries, various actors negotiate for climate 
finance and influence its delivery. The incentives they 
derive from their mandates, organisational structures, 
procedures and policies, and from their resources and 
knowledge base, can strengthen these decision-making 
coalitions (Abdelal et al., 2009, Kroll and Shogren, 
2008). When they share ideas, their influence can be 
compelling (Riviere, 2014).
Decision makers need to understand this political 
economy in order to deliver plans that have wide 
stakeholder support. Clarity about the political 
economy of climate investments can help leaders build 
opportunities for consensus, avoid obstacles and pick 
more equitable and representative investments. 
This paper explores how the underlying political 
economy in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Nepal has 
shaped decisions institutionalising two CIF funds 
(the PPCR and SREP), how those countries have 
prioritised investment decisions, and have selected 
funding instruments. It examines narratives, discourses 
and drivers to explain how actors’ ideas and incentives 
interact, shaping how climate finance is used.
It offers policy makers case studies that can help 
build a deeper understanding that will, in turn, help 
them manage expectations and steer opportunities 
for consensus-based outcomes for climate finance 
programmes. For example, understanding a country’s 
political economy can help remove bottlenecks during 
planning and implementation, manage risks early, 
develop equitable investments and generate policy 
dialogues. It enables governments and development 
partners to find pathways that achieve timely and 
equitable outcomes, often by reshaping incentives. 
The paper’s learnings will also help inform the 
green Climate Fund (gCF), which is expected to be 
operational by october 2015. 
3 A country’s readiness refers to its capacity to plan for, access, deliver, and monitor and report on climate finance, both international and domestic, in ways 
that are catalytic and fully integrated with national development priorities and the achievement of the MDGs (UNDP 2012. Readiness for climate finance; A 
framework for addressing what it means to be ready to use climate finance).
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2 
Approach and 
methods 
The PEA approach
This study uses a political economy analysis (PEA) to 
understand what influences and shapes decisions about 
international climate finance within recipient countries. 
It takes Tanner and Allouche’ s (2011) definition of 
political economy as the processes by which ideas, 
power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated 
and implemented by different groups at different scales. 
Their approach assumes policy decisions are “not just 
a rational choice, but shaped by new ideas, incentives, 
power plays and actors”.
The paper focuses on three main elements4 of political 
economy, adapted from the Institute for Development 
Studies’ KNoTS framework (IDS, 2006) (see Figure 1):
• Actors and their coalitions: Who is involved in 
decision-making and how are they connected? Do 
they form coalitions? 
• Ideologies, discourses and narratives: What are 
the dominant ideologies/knowledge and conceptual 
framings around CIF objectives that shape coalitions, 
decisions and actions?
• Incentives: What are the underlying drivers, 
incentives and resources that shape these decisions? 
Figure 1. Political economy elements
Actors/Networks
Ideologies/ 
Knowledge/ 
Discourse
 Incentives
DECISIoN outComES/ 
RESPoNSES to ClImAtE ChANgE
PlANNINg ImPlEmENtAtIoN lEARNINg
4 Power is an important element in a political economy analysis. However, in this study we haven’t analysed power dimensions in an absolute manner; we reflect 
on incentives and resources that strengthen actors to use power in decision making. 
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Methods 
The research takes a ‘national PEA’ approach that 
invites country governments themselves to analyse 
how their domestic political economy might enable 
or constrain climate finance projects under the Pilot 
Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and the Scaling 
up Renewable Energy Program (SREP), using an action 
learning approach. 
The study took five key steps (see Figure 2). 
Around 80 stakeholders were interviewed from 
eight categories of stakeholders (Table 1). Interview 
questions aimed to understand actors’ narratives 
and their interpretations of the core objectives of 
climate funds. 
Figure 2: Steps in a PEA analysis
Table 1: Categories of actors interviewed during the semi-structured interviews
INvolvEmENt CAtEgoRIES Who thEy ARE? 
Those directly 
involved in design and 
implementation 
government core ministries Ministry of Finance and Environment Ministries 
government executing line 
departments 
Line departments directly implementing CIF
Multilateral Development Banks Actors directly involved in delivering CIF 
Not directly involved other government actors government actors not directly involved in CIF 
delivery or those who have fallen out during the 
implementation stage
other multilateral actors For example UNDP
Civil Society Civil society organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, think tanks 
Private sector Private sector associations, relevant 
independent private companies 
Bilateral agencies Donors and development partners 
StEP 1: SItuAtIoN ANAlySIS 
IDENtIFIES DECISIoN PoINtS
StEP 2: ACtoR mAPPINg
StEP 3: NARRAtIvE ANAlySIS 
StEP 4: IDENtIFy INCENtIvES 
StEP 5: ANAlySE 
INtERACtIoNS 
StEP 6: INFoRm PolICy 
Research partners undertook a systematic literature review supported by semi-
structured scoping interviews to identify key decisions and negotiation points 
during different stages of PPCR and SREP.
A stakeholder analysis produced an ‘actor map’ that helped understand who the 
main actors are, their roles, interests and influence during different programme 
stages.
The study used a thematic discourse approach to analysing narratives that 
categorises similar aspects of people’s accounts (Reissman, 2008). Semi-
structured questions aimed to understand actors’ narratives (how they frame 
problems, solutions and policy objectives) and their interpretations of core 
PPCR and SREP objectives, such as ‘transformational change’, ‘private sector 
engagement’, ‘development impacts’ and ‘country ownership’. 
Interviews were further analysed to understand the economic incentives, policy 
goals and compelling evidence that can strengthen decision making coalitions.
In each of the three study countries, interactions between actors, their ideological 
framings and incentives were analysed using Hajer’s discourse framework and 
IDS’s KNoTS framework (Hajer, 1993, IDS, 2006) to understand how people 
form coalitions to support decisions under both PPCR and SREP (see figure 3).
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Figure 3: Analysis of PEA interactions
ACtoRS
KNoWlEDgE/ 
PERCEPtIoNS
DRIvERS/
INCENtIvES
DECISIoN  
outComES
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3 
Climate Investment 
Funds (CIFs): 
background 
The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) channel is 
designed to assist developing countries pilot low-
emission and climate-resilient development. The funds 
comprise of four funding windows within two trust funds 
– the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic 
Climate Fund (SCF). Box 1 provides an overview of the 
CIF and Figure 4 illustrates how the CIFs fit relative to 
other major international initiatives.
The Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) is designed to 
support three targeted programmes:
• The Forest Investment Programme (FIP) 
• The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) 
• The Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) 
These last two are the focus of this study. 
Overview of PPCR
The PPCR was approved in 2008 to create an 
integrated, scaled-up approach to climate change 
adaptation in low-income countries. It aims for 
transformational change from a ‘business as usual’ 
project-led paradigm to a coherent long term 
programmatic strategy (CIF, 2011). Funding is provided 
in two stages (see Box 2). 
Nine pilot countries (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan, Yemen and 
Zambia) and two regional groupings (six Caribbean 
island countries and three Pacific island countries) 
participate in the PPCR. The primary donors that fund 
Box 1: hIghlIghtS oF CIF
• operates in 63 developing countries. 
• Programmatic, not ‘project by project’ approach. 
• Total pledges worth $5.5 billion to CTF and $2.5 
billion to the SCF. 
• The PPCR receives 52% ($1.3 billion) of the SCF 
and has already disbursed US$46.8m. 
• By october 2014 $5.3 billion of the pledged 
fund had been approved for CIFs projects 
(BWP, 2014). 
• Implemented by MDBs. 
• The CIF operate outside the UNFCCC mechanism 
(see figure 4) but have a ‘sunset’ clause that 
expects them to phase out once the UNFCCC’s 
green Climate Fund (gCF) is operational. 
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PPCR are Australia, Canada, Denmark, germany, 
Japan, Norway, Spain, UK and USA. 
Overview of SREP
The SREP was established in 2009 to pilot and 
demonstrate the economic, social and environmental 
viability of low carbon development in the energy 
sector (Rai et al., 2013). SREP provides financing for 
renewable energy technologies such as solar thermal 
and photovoltaic systems, wind energy, bio-energy, 
geothermal energy and small-scale hydropower. 
The private sector is envisaged to play a key role 
in promoting renewable energy. SREP projects 
are expected to consist of both renewable energy 
investments (including infrastructure investments) and 
capacity building and advisory services, as well as 
support for policy changes that increase the use of 
renewable energy. A number of financing products such 
as grants, contingent grants or loans, concessional 
loans, guarantees and equity are available under the 
SREP (CIF, 2010b). Similar to the PPCR funding is 
disbursed in two phases. In Phase I, pre-investment 
support is provided to the participating governments 
to develop an investment plan and associated advisory 
services are provided. Phase two funds are for 
implementing the investment plan (CIF 2010b).
SREP’s criteria for allocating funds state that an 
enabling regulatory environment that promotes business 
‘is desirable’. For the renewable energy sector, an 
enabling environment may include policies that support 
private sector participation, public-private partnerships, 
or help make financing available for renewable energy 
technologies (CIF, 2010a).
In 2010, six pilot countries were selected: Ethiopia, 
Honduras, Kenya, the Maldives, Mali and Nepal. Four 
more countries joined after 2013: Armenia, Liberia, 
Tanzania and the Solomon Islands. Primary funders 
to SREP are Australia, Denmark, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
and USA (BWP, 2014).
Figure 4: Overview of climate finance mechanisms 
Box 2. FuNDINg StAgES FoR PPCR
Stage 1: Prepare SPCR
• Involves a planning grant supporting preparation of 
a proposal for a Strategic Programme for Climate 
Resilience (SPCR)
• The SPCR includes funds for two types of 
investment: i) technical assistance and ii) 
investment finance.
• Technical assistance is for countries to integrate 
climate resilience into national and sectoral 
development plans, and incudes grant funding 
for policy reform, capacity building, and long-term 
institutional strengthening.
• Investment finance is for on the ground investments 
that focus on up to three themes or sub-regions 
within the country. It is a combination of grant 
and loans.
Stage 2: Implement programmes
• The second stage provides financing of up to 
US$60 million in grants and up to US$50 million in 
loans for actual investments.
• This stage also includes further technical assistance 
such as capacity building, if needed.
uNFCCC WoRlD BANK AND mDBs
AF gCFlDCF SCCF
gloBAl ENvIRoNmENtAl 
FACIlIty (gEF) ClImAtE INvEStmENt FuNDS (uS$7.6B)
ClEAN tEChNology 
FuND
StRAtEgIC ClImAtE 
FuND
SREP FIP PPCR
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4 
Actors and 
governance choices
Although PPCR and SREP use common governance 
mechanisms and programme cycles for all pilot 
countries, these countries have been at different stages 
of ‘readiness’. Country contexts and MDB approaches 
have significantly determined how SREP and PPCR 
have been institutionalised. .
This section looks briefly at the governance 
arrangements for PPCR and SREP at the international 
level and then discusses national governance for the 
two programmes in Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Nepal, 
examining core leadership, institutional governance and 
implementation arrangements. The sections following 
then look at investment choices within funds, and at 
each country’s choice of funding instruments.
International climate 
finance governance
At the international level, the Climate Investment Funds 
(CIFs) are overseen by the CIF Administration Unit (CIF 
AU) within the World Bank and implemented through 
MDBs including the: African Development Bank (AfDB), 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), World Bank (WB) 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
Each of the three SCF programmes are governed by 
the SCF Trust Fund Committee, a programme specific 
sub-committee (one for PPCR and one for SREP) with 
observers, a partnership forum, a MDB committee, an 
administrative unit, and a trustee. 
National climate finance 
governance
SREP and PPCR investment plans are to be developed, 
endorsed and implemented through national systems. At 
the national level, institutionalising either fund entails: 
• Selecting a focal and executing agency to administer 
and execute the investment plan, and 
• Establishing a mechanism to coordinate programme 
activities in different phases and define the 
roles and responsibilities of ministries, MDBs, 
government departments, and private sector and civil 
society partners.
The arrangements vary depending on a country’s 
institutional readiness (Rai and Anderson, 2013). The 
key actors and the linkages between them are outlined 
in Figure 5 and described below. 
Focal ministries: Core ministries such as finance, 
planning or environment ministries endorse and 
coordinate the planning and implementation process. 
Regional MDBs: MDBs implement investment 
programmes with the government executing entities. 
Executing entities: Line ministries and departments 
such as water or energy ministries implement investment 
projects with a MDB counterpart. 
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PPCR governance 
arrangements in Nepal and 
Bangladesh
Each country has taken its own approach to setting 
up a governance mechanism. Some have defined 
new implementation arrangements, and others have 
harnessed existing ones (more evident in PPCR than 
in SREP, due to the programme’s dedicated technical 
assistance for ‘mainstreaming’ and institutional capacity 
development). Some PPCR countries have shifted core 
climate change leadership from environment to finance 
and planning ministries because these have ‘convening 
authority’ across multi-sector climate change issues. 
Table 2 highlights key institutions involved in different 
capacities in PPCR in Bangladesh and Nepal. 
Core leadership: The environment and finance 
ministries are designated focal authorities for PPCR 
in Bangladesh. Co-financing in PPCR projects from 
the government of Bangladesh and its implementation 
through annual development planning budgets also 
demonstrates greater buy-in beyond the environment 
ministry. Nepal decided to select its environment 
ministry (MoSTE) as the lead PPCR agency, despite 
external preference for the Ministry of Finance 
(Rai, 2013a). 
Governance arrangements: A number of Bangladesh 
institutions can absorb and operationalise international 
climate finance flows. The two national climate 
funds, the government-funded Bangladesh Climate 
Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) and the multi-donor 
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) 
both offered a wide range of institutions for cross-
sectoral coordination. BCCRF’s existing institutional 
arrangement was therefore harnessed to position 
PPCR in Bangladesh under the Joint Secretary of 
MoEF. Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal set up a wide range 
of new institutions with PPCR support. These included 
two coordination committees for PPCR and for multi-
stakeholder coordination amongst government, MDBs 
and Ngos (see Table 2). 
Implementation arrangements: Line ministries 
or departments, in collaboration with MDB 
counterparts implement programmes prioritised 
in the investment proposal (SPCR). National line 
ministries and departments which were already 
channelling considerable resources continue to be 
the key recipients of funds in Bangladesh (Rai et 
al., 2014, ICF, 2013). For example, the Bangladesh 
Water Development Board (BWDB) and the Local 
government Engineering Department (LgED) have 
received 45 per cent of BCCRF and BCCTF funds 
so far and now implement the two PPCR investment 
projects. These departments also have long-standing 
partnerships with MDB counterparts, with whom they 
Figure 5: Key institutions and links for SREP and PPCR. Source: adapted from UNDP (UNDP, 2011)
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implement the PPCR. In Nepal, the key line departments 
responsible for implementing the fund with MDBs are 
the Department of Soil Conservation and Watershed 
Management (DSCWM) and the Department of 
Hydrology and Meteorology. 
The private sector investment in agriculture and food 
security was originally planned to be implemented by 
IFC and ministries of agriculture in both countries. In 
Bangladesh, the role has been transferred to the MoEF 
to overcome differences in mandates and objectives 
between IFC and the agriculture ministry. In Nepal the 
private sector agriculture component is implemented 
directly by IFC. 
Civil society, development partners and other 
multilaterals such as UNDP were involved in 
Bangladesh’s initial consultation process on PPCR, but 
have limited input into programme delivery. 
SREP governance 
arrangements in Ethiopia 
and Nepal
SREP’s primary focus is investments, though there 
has been some support for policy reform and capacity 
development. For most SREP countries the focal 
ministry has a mandate for energy. When establishing 
an institutional architecture to steer, coordinate and 
manage the SREP, countries have involved existing 
institutions but often combined this with shaping a 
range of new coordinating points, as seen for Ethiopia 
and Nepal (Table 3). 
Table 2: Institutions involved in PPCR in Bangladesh and Nepal 
CouNtRy INStItutIoNAl PlANNINg AND 
CooRDINAtIoN mEChANISm
ImPlEmENtINg 
ARRANgEmENt
Bangladesh Focal ministries 
Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF)
Ministry of Finance (MoF)
Institutional arrangement: 
Harnessing existing mechanism set up for 
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF), within MoEF. 
MDBs
World Bank
Counterpart line 
ministries/department
Water Development Board 
ADB Local govt Engineering 
Department 
IFC Previously Ministry of 
Agriculture
Now MoEF. 
Nepal Focal ministries
Ministry of Science Technology and Environment 
(MoSTE)
Institutional arrangement:  
New institutions within MoSTE: 
• 2 coordination committees- PPCR coordination 
committee chaired by MoSTE and the National 
Planning Commission, and the Multi stakeholder 
Climate Change Coordination Committee. 
• Climate Change Programme Results Framework 
Coordination Committee (CCPRF CC) 
facilitates coordination between committees. 
ADB Department of Soil 
Conservation and 
Watershed Management 
(DSCWM)
IFC MoSTE
WB • Dept. of Hydrology and 
Meteorology
• Ministry of Agriculture 
Development (MoAD)
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Core leadership
Nepal has designated its finance and environment 
ministries as focal points for SREP. In Ethiopia, overall 
responsibility for the SREP lies with the Environmental 
Ministerial Council, an inter-ministerial group that 
controls strategy for the country’s Climate Resilient 
green Economy Facility, of which the SREP is 
a constituent.
Governance and implementation 
arrangement
In Nepal, the SREP is coordinated by a single semi-
autonomous agency responsible for investing in small 
scale renewables (AEPC) (AEPC, 2013). A Central 
Renewable Energy Fund (CREF) and a steering 
board have also been set up to mobilise funds from 
different instruments and engage with the private 
sector. A dedicated agency allows institutional focus on 
decentralised energy up to 10 megawatts. Large scale 
energy projects are the energy ministry’s responsibility. 
Moving forward, the energy ministry would need to have 
a key role in scaling up renewables in Nepal but this will 
require much more coordination between MoSTE and 
the Ministry of Energy than currently exists. 
In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy 
(MoWIE) and the Climate Resilient green Economy 
Facility are the key focal authorities. MoWIE leads 
the coordination and management through its SREP 
coordination unit. Ethiopia’s geothermal and wind 
components of SREP are implemented by the Ethiopian 
Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo) and the Ministry of 
Mines in collaboration with a MDB counterpart. 
In both countries, the IFC aims to catalyse private sector 
involvement with renewable energy technologies by 
providing incentives to commercial banks. In Nepal, 
the private sector has been engaged in the SREP 
prioritisation process and CREF will manage the private 
sector component under the leadership of a commercial 
bank. The IFC and ADB aim to incentivise the private 
sector to invest in grid-connected renewables. As 
with PPCR, the private sector component is a direct 
agreement between the MDBs and the private sector 
in both countries, with limited engagement of public 
bodies. However, in Ethiopia, parallel but inadequately 
coordinated efforts between IFC and the National 
Banks of Ethiopia have caused delays in implementation 
(refer to Annex 1 for details). 
Table 3: Institutions involved in SREP in Ethiopia and Nepal
CouNtRy INStItutIoNAl PlANNINg AND 
CooRDINAtIoN mEChANISm
ImPlEmENtINg 
mEChANISm
Ethiopia Focal ministry
Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy (MoWIE)
Institutional arrangement:  
Inter-ministerial committee of the CRgE Facility
MDBs
AfDB
Counterpart line ministry/
Department
Ministry of Mines
WB Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation (EEPCo)
IFC Private sector
Nepal Focal ministries 
Ministry of Science Technology and Environment
Ministry of Finance 
Institutional arrangement: SREP steering 
committee.  
WB Alternative Energy Promotion 
Centre (AEPC)
Central Renewable Energy 
Fund (CREF)
ADB AEPC
IFC  MoSTE
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5 
Investment choices 
within the funds
Phase one of both programmes involves a multi-sectoral 
dialogue to plan investments. The aim is to develop a 
Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR) for 
PPCR and an investment plan (for SREP). Funding is 
made available for capacity building for policy reform 
and long-term institutional strengthening through 
technical assistance and ‘on the ground’ investments. 
Investments usually focus on one or two themes or 
sub-regions within the country (for PPCR) and on 
renewable technologies (for SREP), financed through a 
combination of grants and loans. 
The plans are customised by each country. A country’s 
capacity and priorities, leadership in focal ministries, 
existing relationship between MDBs and executing 
ministries (and their investment record), policy and 
planning support, available co-finance and the ability 
of pipeline projects to unlock finance all determine 
what investment projects are prioritised. Annex 1 gives 
considerably more detail on planned investments, 
country-by-country.
PPCR investment choices
The project portfolio for PPCR is diverse. of the 
total US$1.3 billion PPCR funding, maximum funds 
have been prioritised for agriculture and landscape 
management and water resource management. The 
sector and type of investment also determine the co-
financing received. For example, within the PPCR (see 
Figure 6), coastal zone management and infrastructure 
has generated high additional finance compared with 
work on climate information systems and an enabling 
environment (because more agencies contribute for 
such investments) (CIF, 2014). 
The PPCR’s process for developing the SPCR is 
flexible and customised to country readiness. Both 
Nepal and Bangladesh had well-defined climate change 
priorities through their National Adaptation Plan of 
Action (NAPA). Bangladesh’s climate change strategies 
allowed it to leapfrog SPCR’s initial exploratory phase. 
The government of Nepal also wanted to move directly 
towards investments, pointing to the adaptation planning 
taking place as Nepal developed its NAPA. However, 
the MDBs considered the NAPA to have a short-term 
remit compared with the longer-term climate resilience 
focus of the PPCR, and wanted a detailed preparatory 
assessment. As a result, the process of planning 
Nepal’s SPCR began without consensus from all 
parties, making it a less than ideal start (Rai, 2013a). 
These early processes have delivered both challenges 
and opportunities. Affording flexibility to Bangladesh 
was crucial in ensuring the government’s interest 
and ownership of the programme. But bypassing the 
dedicated preparation phase also meant roles and 
responsibilities were not clearly defined, causing 
later interruptions in delivering the SPCR. In Nepal, 
the relationships between stakeholders evolved 
and the government’s work on the NAPA was 
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reflected in later versions. Core features of the PPCR 
investment outcomes are summarised in Table 4 and 
discussed below. 
Comparison of PPCR investment 
choices in Bangladesh and Nepal
Nepal’s PPCR investments are divided between 
capacity-building projects and climate information 
systems, in line with its national adaptation plan. 
Bangladesh favoured infrastructure projects rather than 
‘softer’ investments in capacity building. Now, however, 
as the countries move from planning to implementation 
of PPCR, coordination between the executing 
departments is becoming an issue. In Bangladesh, for 
example, there were plans to improve forests around 
the coastal embankments that are being repaired, but 
this side of the project has been cut back because of 
insufficient cooperation between the water development 
board and the forestry department. Likewise, private-
sector projects in both countries have experienced 
delays. Policymakers, companies and the IFC would 
need to work through their differences to arrive at a 
shared vision for engaging private sector. For a more 
detailed overview of decision outcomes, see Annex 
1 or Table 4. The discussion here highlights the main 
decision outcomes.
Programmatic investment planning: Programmatic 
investment planning is an innovation within CIF. 
Bangladesh’s plan focused on all investments in the 
coastal areas of the country. Nepal on the other hand 
has prioritised its agriculture sector within its investment 
plan. Although both defined ‘programmatic’ differently, 
both translated their proposals into projects with 
capacity building and mainstreaming support, although 
technical assistance is higher in Nepal. 
Planning decisions: Although planning consultations 
were inclusive, investment planning decisions have 
been strongly driven by a core group of focal ministries, 
MDBs and their traditional government counterparts. 
Investment decisions: Bangladesh has used the 
PPCR money to top up and scale up infrastructure 
investment. Their transformative strategy has focussed 
on increasing the scope and scale of adaptation 
actions, with limited focus on building institutional 
capacity through technical assistance. Nepal, on the 
other hand, focuses on districts’ and communities’ 
adaptive capacities and invests in climate information 
systems, adaptation tools, instruments, methods and 
strategies. Bangladesh prioritised coastal infrastructure 
because of available co-financing (the finance required 
was enormous and PPCR funds were relatively 
small), existing partnerships and the investment 
experience of MDBs and line departments in coastal 
infrastructure development. The government’s ability to 
use concessional loans, raise co-finance and harness 
existing partnerships has also encouraged investment 
in coastal infrastructure in Bangladesh. Nepal on the 
other hand has targeted PPCR funds towards capacity 
development and agriculture sector, building on national 
priorities articulated in its NAPA. 
Figure 6: PPCR funding and available co-financing by investment type
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Table 4: PPCR projects portfolio, Bangladesh and Nepal
BANglADESh
Investment Project 1: Promoting Climate Resilient Agriculture and Food Security. (Private sector component). 
The project aims to catalyse private sector involvement in adaptive agriculture: scaling up climate resilient 
varieties of rice and crops, providing efficient irrigation systems, and developing early warning systems for 
farming communities.
Instruments: grant and loan total: 13 US $m; PPCR grant: 3*; Concessional loan: 10 
Implementing agencies: MDB: IFC; gov line department: Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) of the 
Ministry of Agriculture involved initially. MoEF is now the government counterpart for this role. 
Investment Project 2: Coastal Embankments Improvement Project (CEIP) and Afforestation. 
• Rehabilitate and climate proof embankments and polders. 
• Rehabilitate or build water management related structures within polders. 
• Finance coastal afforestation alongside embankments 
• A participatory monitoring system
Instruments: grant and loan total: 325 US $m; PPCR grant: 25; IDA credit: 300 
Implementing agencies: MDB: World Bank; government line department: Bangladesh Water Development 
Board, the Forest Department (FD) and the Bangladesh Forestry Research Institute (BFRI). 
Investment Project 3: Coastal Climate Resilient Water Supply, Sanitation, and Infrastructure Improvement. 
Project 3a: Climate Resilient Infrastructure Improvement in Coastal Zone Project. Project seeks to build 
resilience for coastal roads, jetties, schools and urban drainage systems. government part of funds will go 
towards restoring the livelihoods of coastal fishing communities. 
Instruments: PPCR grant: 10; PPCR loan: 20; Co-financing from ADB: 20; KFW:8, goB;31 
Implementing agencies: MDB: ADB; gov: LgED, Department of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE), 
Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, Water Supply and Sewerage Authority.
Project 3a: Coastal Town Infrastructure Project, seeks to provide basic services such as water supply and 
sanitation, and to restore livelihoods in coastal towns.
Instruments: The US$117 million required is funded by PPCR (US$10 m credit and US$20 m grant), by the 
government of Bangladesh (US$23.2 m), and through grant support from Bill and Melinda gates foundation 
(US$1.5 m grant) and credit support from ADB (US$52 m).
Technical Assistance 1: Capacity building: Climate Change Capacity Building and Knowledge Management.
Instruments: grant only: $0.5m
Implementing agencies: MDB: Asian development Bank (ADB); gov: MoEF and Economic Resource 
Division (ERD)
Technical Assistance 2: Feasibility Study for a Pilot Program of Climate Resilient Housing in the 
Coastal region.
Instruments: grant only: $0.4m
Implementing agencies: MDB: IFC; gov: MoFDM/LgE
continues
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NEPAl 
Investment Project 1: Building Climate Resilience of Watersheds in Mountain Eco-Regions. The project 
aims to build resilience of freshwater resources in mountain eco-regions in order to improve agricultural 
productivity, including: 
• Participatory planning for watershed management
• Implementing watershed management plans in priority watersheds
• Water efficient measures
• Incorporating lessons on improving access and reliability of water resources in vulnerable mountain regions.
Instruments: Total 30.6 million USD; Project preparation grant 0.5; PPCR grant 23.53; ADB Water Facility 
Fund 0.5; Nordic Development Fund (grant) 2; government grant proposed 4.03
Implementing agencies: MDB: ADB; gov: Department of Soil Conservation and Water Management
Investment Project 2: Building Resilience to Climate-Related Hazards: Aims to build community resilience to 
climate related hazards, by supporting early warning systems for improved farming practices as well climate risk 
insurance mechanisms. The project has four parts: 
• Institutional strengthening, capacity building and implementation support for the Department of Hydrology and 
Meteorology (DHM)
• Modernisation of observation networks and early warning systems. 
• Enhancing the DHM’s service delivery system
• Creating an agriculture management information system (AMIS). 
• DHM is responsible for the first three parts and MoAD is responsible for the fourth. 
Instruments: Total $31.3m; CIF grant 16; Loan 15; government grant proposed 0.3. 
Implementing agencies: MDB: World Bank; gov: Department of Hydrology and Meteorology
Technical assistance project 3: Mainstreaming Climate Risk Management in Development. The TA offers 
support to integrate climate change risk management into planning and practices. It also supports work to 
develop and apply knowledge management tools in response to climate change. The programme has developed 
a training package on community based assessments of climate change vulnerability and will also document 
traditional and indigenous adaptation practices in Nepal. 
Instruments: CIF grant 7 million USD
Implementing agencies: MDB: ADB; gov: MoSTE
Investment project 4: Building Climate Resilient Communities through Private Sector Participation. This 
project aims to address market barriers that discourage private sector and local financial institutions from 
investing in climate change adaptation actions. It seeks private collaboration in climate resilient agriculture, 
hydropower and low cost climate resilient housing.
Instruments: Total: 8.7 million USD; CIF grant 2.1; Project preparation grant 0.3; Loan 6.6
Implementing agencies: MDB-IFC
Investment project 5: Enhancing Climate Resilience of Endangered Species. Aims to address the risks climate 
change poses to endangered wildlife. 
Instruments: CIF grant 5 million USD
Implementing agencies: MDB- World Bank; gov- Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation
* All figures in US$ million.
Table 4: PPCR projects portfolio, Bangladesh and Nepal (cont.)
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Implementation of planned projects: Coordination 
between executing departments will be crucial for 
effective delivery of the PPCR. In Bangladesh, PPCR 
has not entirely managed to achieve inter-departmental 
cooperation. The forestry component within the coastal 
embankment project has been reduced because of 
insufficient cooperation between the water development 
board and forestry department (who own much of 
the land around coastal embankments). Unbalanced 
allocation of implementation resources between the 
hydro-meteorological component and the agriculture 
dissemination component in Nepal’s PPCR has also 
caused discontent. This component was meant to be 
linking agriculture farmers to an early warning system. 
A large share of the project is allocated for building 
hydro- meteorology infrastructure, acquiring new 
technologies and capacity building within the hydro-
meteorology department, with much less development 
of climate resilient technologies that the agriculture 
ministry had envisaged. These differences are capable 
of undermining implementation in later stages (see 
Annex 1 for further details on the project).
Private sector component: PPCR seeks to catalyse 
private sector involvement in climate change adaptation. 
Public finance is used to remove barriers to private 
sector investment. Both Bangladesh and Nepal have 
used a similar model to engage the private sector in 
agriculture and food security issues. However, both 
experienced delays due to reduced buy in from the 
implementing agriculture ministry, which is unconvinced 
about private sector capacities and roles in climate 
change adaptation. These actors also believe that 
government has systems in place that makes the 
public sector better placed to deliver projects for 
farmers, whilst the private sector is best suited to a 
complementary role. Conflicts between the IFC’s 
mandate to work directly with the private sector and the 
governments’ emphasis on harnessing existing public 
sector channels have hindered the implementation of 
private sector oriented investment projects.
SREP Investment Choices 
SREP’s investment portfolio comprises two segments: 
a) energy access through investments in mini grids 
(hydro, PV and wind), off-grid distributed PV technology 
and improved cook stoves and b) increased grid-
tied technology, including geothermal, wind, solar 
PV, solar-wind hybrids, hydro and waste-to-energy 
projects (Figure 7). Until 2013, about 25 per cent of 
SREP funds were targeting ‘energy access’ projects 
while 65 per cent were used to add renewable energy 
to the electricity grid, and 10% were allocated to 
capacity building. 
Table 5 and the section below summarise the planning 
and prioritisation outcomes for SREP in Ethiopia 
and Nepal.
Comparison of SREP investment 
choices 
To fuel a growing gross domestic product (gDP) and 
avoid the climate sensitivity of hydropower, Ethiopia 
decided to put large-scale geothermal and wind on 
the grid. Nepal, on the other hand, planned to spread 
energy to remote areas by investing in small-scale 
Figure 7: Distribution of SREP funding by energy technology mix (in US$ million as of 2013)
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hydropower (both on- and off-grid), solar and wind, 
and waste-to-energy generation. But the diffusion of 
narratives indicates a last-minute change in this plan, 
replacing large multilateral investments in small-scale 
hydropower with grid-tied solar projects (still under 
discussion at the time of this study). The private sector 
will still take in about 50% of SREP funding in Nepal, 
but only 10% in Ethiopia.
For a fuller discussion of SREP investment choices see 
Annex 1.
Large scale infrastructure vs ‘energy access’ 
projects: Nepal and Ethiopia have taken different 
approaches in investing in renewable energy. Ethiopia 
focuses on large scale grid-based technologies in order 
to meet its growth objectives. The aim is to enhance 
the scale of energy by diversifying from unreliable 
hydropower to geothermal and wind power. Nepal, on 
the other hand, has emphasised energy access targets 
for households, which was initially to be met by investing 
in small hydro (recently changed to grid-tied solar), and 
Table 5: SREP projects portfolio, Ethiopia and Nepal
EthIoPIA
Investment Project 1: Aluto Langano geothermal Field Development and geothermal Sector Strategy. The 
project intends to:
• Explore, drill and build capacity for construction of 75 MW of geothermal power
• Develop a long term strategy for exploiting geothermal 
• Exhibit commercial and technical viability of geothermal technology 
• Develop investable projects in geothermal to achieve Ethiopia’s vision for 1 gW geothermal by 2030
Instruments: grant and loan total: 233.6 US $m; SREP fund 26; government 81.1; MDB 60.0; others 66.5 
Implementing agencies: MDB: AfDB; gov.: Ministry of Mines, Former Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) now structured into Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEF).
Investment Project 2: Assela Wind Farm Project. SREP funds will invest in: 100 MW of wind generation 
capacity; Local capacities and manufacturing, which will help reduced technology costs.
Instruments: Total grant and loan: 250 US $m; SREP fund 20; government 40; MDB 140; others 50
Implementing agencies: MDB: World Bank, gov: EEPCo
Investment Project 3: Clean Energy SMEs Capacity Building and Investment Facility. Have two distinct 
aspects. 
• It intends to build market players’ capacity through a technical assistance component that aims to ‘skill up’ 
women-run SMEs and remove barriers for suppliers of clean energy products such as home-based cook 
stoves, mini grids or solar home systems. 
• Funds will also support banks to develop their capacity for assessing the risks of investing in SMEs. 
• A financial component funds risk-sharing agreements with local banks to encourage ‘risky renewables lending’, 
particularly for new manufacturing facilities and local SMEs in the renewable energy sector.
Instruments: Total grant and loan: 12 US $m; SREP fund 4; MDB 4; others 4. 
Implementing agencies: MDB: IFC; government: Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy (MoWIE), Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED)
SREP reserve project 1: Tendaho geothermal Field Development 2. Sor SHEPP expansion project. The 
second tier of SREP includes activities/projects that will be implemented by funds from SREP’s reserve fund. In 
october 2012, the CIF Forum decided to allocate the reserve fund for private sector engagement. Ethiopia has 
allocated US$19.5 million for programmes to develop the Tendaho geothermal field and expand and rehabilitate 
the Sor small hydropower plant. 
Instruments: 
• Tendaho geothermal Field Development; Total: 319.6 US$m; SREP 10; goE 60.85; MDB 188; others 60.75
• Sor SHEPP expansion project; Total: 25.1 US$m; SREP 9.0; goE 5.0; others 10.2
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by investing in off-grid mini micro hydro, solar and wind 
hybrid, and extended waste-to-energy generation. 
Proven technologies vs diversification: Ethiopia 
aims to enhance the scale of energy production by 
diversifying from unreliable hydropower to geothermal 
and wind power. Nepal has emphasised scaling up 
proven technologies such as hydropower for productive 
uses. Pilots for new technologies such as solar-wind 
hybrid and extended biogas have met disagreement 
because concessional loans have been used for funding 
them and because technologies such as waste-to-
energy don’t have enough proven success in contexts 
similar to Nepal. 
Private sector investment: Ninety per cent of SREP 
funds in Ethiopia will be channelled through public 
sector projects while 10 per cent will be channelled 
through the private sector. In Nepal the public-private 
portfolio is 50:50. This is largely because IFC in 
Nepal has opted for commercially viable grid-based 
investments. Ethiopia on the other hand has retained 
SREP investment in grid-based public sector funded 
projects. Ethiopia’s government is sceptical about the 
readiness of private sector to lead on renewable energy 
projects. There is also an emphasis on localisation and 
nurturing of the local private sector, which is clearly 
not ready to engage in large grid-based projects. As a 
result, the private sector component is limited to building 
capacities of market players, including commercial 
banks and SMEs. But regulatory barriers affect the 
involvement of commercial banks. Because of this, 
the project’s implementation has been delayed (see 
Annex 1 for further details).
NEPAl 
Investment project 1: Small hydropower development- on grid. ADB and IFC proposed to create an enabling 
environment for the private sector to invest in grid connected small hydro. The project intends to build capacities 
of local banks and demonstrate a viable investment environment for them to invest in renewable investments. 
Rather than provide direct subsidies, the programme will provide subsidised, long tenure loans to commercial 
banks, which will then lend on to commercial hydropower developers. Technical assistance and guarantees will 
be agreed with lending institutions, with the addition of foreign exchange risk support to banks to support market 
development. However, after the approval of plans, ADB stated that their share of funds will come as loans, 
which has caused disagreement within the government of Nepal and therefore delays. Most recently it was 
decided to reallocate funds from small hydro to solar under this component. These are very recent changes and 
the reason for this change was not entirely captured during this study.
Instruments: Total SREP funds 20 US$m
Implementing agencies: IFC and ADB
Investment project 2: Mini and Micro Initiatives: off grid Solar PV and Mini/micro hydro. SREP aims to provide 
affordable energy access to Nepal’s rural populations by building 30MW capacity of mini micro hydropower 
installations and solar home systems. 
Instruments: Total grant 12 US$m
Implementing agencies: ADB and AEPC
Investment project 3: Extended Biogas 
Project aims to scale up municipal ‘waste to energy’ by covering initial costs and removing credit barriers. 
Financing and advisory support will help establish around 160, 000 bio gas plants. This investment project 
was initially designed to support small scale household bio gas. Now it is being implemented, it is focusing 
on more viable opportunities such as community installations in schools and hospitals, and commercial or 
industrial situations.
Instruments: Total 8 US$m
Implementing agencies: MDB: World Bank; gov: AEPC
Table 5: SREP projects portfolio, Ethiopia and Nepal (cont.)
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6 
Choice of funding 
instruments
CIFs use a range of financing instruments, unlike 
the UNFCCC mechanism where funds are usually 
channelled through grants. Different instruments 
suit different investment needs. Risk management 
instruments enable investors to invest in high 
risk investment portfolios. grants are effective in 
supporting investments in climate resilience, and 
capital instruments are effective once investments are 
commercially viable. Some of the options suggested in 
the CIF design document include:
• Concessional loans
• Risk guarantees
• Equity
• Mezzanine financing, and 
• Convertible loans. 
Within PPCR and SREP, grants have been significantly 
used for softer measures such as technical assistance, 
capacity building and for preparatory uses which do 
not seek returns from investments. The private sector 
component is funded through MDB loans. Concessional 
loans allow investments in projects which require high 
scales of finance, such as large scale infrastructure 
investments, which also seek co-finance from a 
range of sources. For example, Bangladesh’s coastal 
embankment projects under the PPCR have been able 
to unlock a large scale of IDA credit due to the nature of 
investment needs. Nepal, by contrast, has mostly used 
grants due to its strong focus on capacity development. 
Concessional loans are only used in Nepal for building 
early warning infrastructure and for catalysing the private 
sector. Similarly, in the case of SREP in Ethiopia, larger-
scale grid-tied energy projects have been able to seek 
greater levels of co-financing through MDB credit (see 
Figures 8–10 below for more detail). 
In practice, neither PPCR nor SREP has used the 
full range of financing instruments available. grants 
and concessional loans have been widely used, and 
risk guarantees in some cases, such as in Ethiopia 
where direct international loans to private sectors are 
not allowed as per the regulations of the country. But 
because the range of contributors have varying levels of 
risk appetite, counties have been somewhat risk averse 
in deploying a full range of instruments (ICF, 2014). In 
some countries, using loans for climate change matters 
is against the policy mandate. For example, in Nepal 
a cabinet decision has ruled out the use of loans for 
climate change investments. As a result, convincing 
government to sign up for loans was a challenge.
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Figure 8: Financing instruments used in PPCR Bangladesh by project type
Figure 9: Financing instruments used in PPCR Nepal by project type
Figure 10: Financing instruments used in SREP Ethiopia
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7 
Networks and 
coalitions around 
narratives 
In Nepal, Bangladesh and Ethiopia, various groups 
of actors have a shared understanding of the core 
objectives of CIF and how PPCR and SREP will:
• Bring transformation 
• Affect development
• Catalyse the private sector
• Ensure country ownership, and 
• Scale up change.
These shared narratives play a strong role in the support 
given to investment decisions as well as the support 
offered during programme implementation. 
Narratives around PPCR 
objectives 
Effective decisions about adaptation investments under 
the PPCR depend on stakeholders coming together 
around a common understanding of development 
pathways and PPCR objectives. Yet in the case 
studies, alternative views also existed that were never 
fully integrated or resolved, but instead remained 
marginalised or widely dispersed among unconnected 
actors. Notably, stakeholders who were not part of the 
consensus in the planning stage sometimes put up 
‘roadblocks’ later during implementation. 
Transformational Change 
Bringing transformational change is one of the core 
objectives of CIFs. Transformation here is understood 
as shifting away from business as usual. It implies 
a long-term process that requires “institutional and 
policy changes, technological shifts, and re-orienting 
investment priorities….to demonstrate effects, remove 
barriers and develop mechanisms for replication” 
(ICF, 2013). 
Within Bangladesh, three broad narratives define 
actors’ interpretations of the PPCR’s ability to bring 
transformation: those who believe it will occur by 
providing climate resilient infrastructure, those who 
look to social innovation for transformation, and 
those who were sceptical about the transformational 
potential of PPCR. The dominant narrative expects 
transformational change to result from infrastructure 
investments and economic growth, and is strong 
amongst actors who are designing and delivering 
PPCR in Bangladesh including the core focal ministries, 
MDBs and executing line departments (see Figure 11). 
Stakeholders who championed social innovation 
and inclusiveness never gained a firm foothold in the 
planning process. Similarly, there was widely scattered 
scepticism about whether PPCR could truly bring about 
a transformation in Bangladesh, but this had little effect 
on decision making. Nevertheless, even if dissenters 
do not sway the policy consensus, they are often in a 
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position to hinder the implementation of projects they 
disagree with. 
In Nepal, a consensus grew around the importance 
of long-term sustainability goals and the need 
for greater capacity for climate adaptation in order 
to bring transformation. This led to investments in 
climate information systems and other capacity-building 
initiatives that will give farmers and local governments a 
stronger basis for making adaptation decisions over the 
coming decades. The PPCR pilot projects were seen as 
just a first step in a long-term approach. Inclusive social 
development was the priority in this dominant narrative, 
while stakeholders who called for more attention to 
infrastructure development, growth and employment 
remained on the fringe (see Figure 11). 
Developmental benefits
CIFs aim to bring about significant development impacts 
such as reducing poverty and enhancing health and 
education, particularly for poor and vulnerable people. 
Countries have outlined how PPCR will achieve 
development impacts within their investment plans. 
Many SPCRs integrate climate vulnerability into poverty 
reduction strategies, community-based adaptation 
and use of climate risk reduction systems for the 
poor, as some of the ways for achieving development 
impacts. But as PPCR countries move from planning 
to implementation, the efforts to bring development 
impacts are not always consistent, and various actor 
groups have diverse opinions on how PPCR will achieve 
meaningful development impacts.
In Bangladesh, the dominant narrative is that 
development impact is expected to be realised 
through following an economic growth pathway. 
MDBs, some core implementing ministries and 
bilateral agencies believe PPCR investments will set 
the country on the path to growth and will generate 
employment opportunities. Those not directly involved 
in PPCR called for more attention to achieving social 
development by investing in equity and inclusivity, but 
this narrative has not translated into PPCR decisions. 
Both social development and the growth discourse are 
also prevalent in Nepal. However, more ‘implementing’ 
government actors take the social development view 
than in Bangladesh, although the views are more 
diffused in Nepal with no clear coalition or consensus. 
Figure 11: Actor narratives on how PPCR will bring transformation in Nepal and Bangladesh
BANglADESh Capacity in CR infrastructure
Socio 
economic 
innovation
Mainstreaming Private sector incl. Sceptical 
Govt- core 
Govt- line ministry 
MDB 
Civil Society 
Other-multilateral  
Govt-Other  
Bilateral  
Source: Semi-structured interviews
NEPAl
Long term 
objectives & 
Sustainability
Increased 
Capacity Mainstreaming 
Capacity in CR 
infra Sceptical 
Govt- core   
Govt- line ministry  
MDB  
Civil Society 
Other-multilateral
Govt-Other   
Bilateral 
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Country ownership and alignment with 
national priorities
The CIFs also seek to encourage country ownership 
in both planning and delivery of the funds. Country 
ownership can be demonstrated in different ways 
including alignment with national priorities (plans and 
strategies), strength of country focal points, wider 
stakeholder involvement in CIF planning and delivery, 
and joint financing by the government (ICF, 2013). 
In both Bangladesh and Nepal, PPCR has been 
successful in aligning within national priorities, plans 
and strategies. However, in Bangladesh PPCR has 
been less effective in broader coordination and inclusion 
of other ministries and departments while implementing 
projects. Stakeholder involvement has been limited 
to receiving information rather than contributing to 
consultation on decision making. Nepal on the other 
hand has had a systematic participation model to 
assess adaptive capacity at different scales. In practice, 
stakeholders have different storylines around the extent 
to which PPCR demonstrates country ownership. 
In Bangladesh the dominant narrative is that having 
decision making powers in the hand of lead 
ministry/ies represents country ownership, 
irrespective of wider stakeholder representation. 
government ownership and ‘will’ is also measured by 
the amount of co-financing the government contributes 
to infrastructure investments. Actors that oppose this 
view believe PPCR lacked wider country ownership 
as decision making and negotiations were limited 
to a few ministries. For these stakeholders, country 
ownership ought to imply nationally set priorities 
and inclusion of stakeholders at many levels, in 
both planning and implementation. This discourse is 
prominent amongst civil society organisations, other 
multilaterals, and government departments that are not 
directly involved in the PPCR. 
Private sector engagement
Catalysing private sector engagement is one of the 
principle objectives of the CIFs. Various incentives 
are being put in place to encourage private sector 
investment in both climate adaptation and mitigation. In 
practice, several factors have affected the success of 
this strategy. 
For example, in both Bangladesh and Nepal, delays 
arose because of differences in mandates and 
opinions between agricultural ministries and IFC 
over the role of the private sector. The PPCR asks 
governments to spend public funds to remove barriers 
Figure 12: Actor narratives on how PPCR will bring development impacts in Bangladesh and Nepal 
BANglADESh Inclusive social development
Growth & 
employment
Govt- core 
Govt- line ministry 
MDB 
Civil Society 
Other-multilateral 
Govt-Other 
Bilateral  
NEPAl Inclusive social development
Growth & 
employment Infra development
PPCR is 
demonstrative only
Govt- core  
Govt- line ministry  
MDB  
Civil Society  
Other-multilateral 
Govt-Other  
Bilateral 
Source: Semi-structured interviews
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Figure 13: Actor narratives on how PPCR considers country ownership in Bangladesh and Nepal
BANglADESh Decision by core govt.
Negotiation by a 
few leaders is not 
country ownership
MDB led Co-financing 
Govt- core 
Govt- line ministry 
MDB  
Civil Society 
Other-multilateral
Govt-Other  
Bilateral 
NEPAl Decision by core govt.
Negotiation by a 
few leaders is not 
country ownership
MDB led Donor led Nationally set priorities
Govt- core  
Govt- line ministry  
MDB 
Civil Society  
Other-multilateral
Govt-Other   
Figure 14: Actors’ views on the role the private sector should have in PPCR
BANglADESh PS is unready PS should lead
PS can have 
a negative 
impact
PS can have 
some role 
PS can 
complement 
but not lead
Govt- core  
Govt- line ministry
MDB 
Civil Society 
Other-multilateral 
Govt-Other   
Bilateral 
NEPAl PS is unready PS should lead
PS can have 
a negative 
impact
PS can have 
some role 
PS can 
complement 
but not lead
Govt- core  
Govt- line ministry 
MDB  
Civil Society   
Other-multilateral
Govt-Other 
Bilateral 
Source: Semi-structured Interviews. 
Source: Semi-structured interviews. 
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to private sector investment in adaptation-related 
activities, but agriculture officials in both countries 
have been reluctant to use public funds to incentivise 
businesses deemed to be profit-oriented. They argue 
that the private sector has few capabilities to lead 
beyond marketing inputs such as seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides. They also feel that government 
departments have better outreach, infrastructure 
and institutions down to the farmer’s level and therefore 
private sector should complement but not lead. 
As a result, several governments have prioritised public 
investments over private investment. And even though 
some actors in Nepal consider the private sector as a 
vehicle for change, such discourses have been unable 
to translate themselves into actions. Because of these 
differences in opinions, the government counterpart for 
implementing PPCR with IFC in Bangladesh will now be 
the Ministry of Environment rather than the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Changes in mandates and roles have also 
delayed PPCR implementation in Bangladesh. 
Table 6: Summary of narratives for PPCR in Bangladesh and Nepal
BANglADESh NEPAl
CoRE 
NARRAtIvES 
AltERNAtE 
NARRAtIvES 
CoRE 
NARRAtIvES 
AltERNAtIvE 
NARRAtIvES 
Transformational 
impact 
Climate resilient 
infrastructure 
investment 
Sceptical 
about PPCRs 
transformational 
potential 
Social innovation 
Targeting long term 
objectives and 
sustainability
Increased capacity
Mainstreaming
Sceptical 
Development 
benefits 
growth and 
employment
Inclusive social 
development
Inclusive social 
development
PPCR is just 
demonstrative 
Infrastructure 
development
growth and 
employment
Country 
Ownership 
Decisions by core 
government
Negotiation by a 
few leaders is not 
country ownership
Dispersed narratives
Decisions by core government 
Nationally set priorities
MDB led
Private sector 
engagement
Private sector can 
take a lead
Private sector can 
complement govt 
activities but is not 
yet ready to lead. 
Dispersed narratives: no core narrative
Private sector should complement public 
sector
Private sector has a role and can lead
Private sector is unready and can have 
negative impacts
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Narratives around SREP 
objectives
Stakeholders involved in planning the SREP investments 
coalesced into groups that shared common narratives 
and visions. They promote a similar pathway for 
transformational change and the development benefits 
to aim for, as well as how to engage the private sector 
and scale up efforts. These coalitions had the power 
to direct investment decisions — leaving actors with 
alternative ideas on the side lines.
Transformational change
In Ethiopia, the government and multilateral development 
banks agreed that diversifying energy technologies 
was a transformative move that would drive economic 
growth (Figure 15). This led decision makers to prioritise 
grid-based geothermal and wind energy projects. Yet 
within Ethiopia there were also other, less mainstream 
views on how to make SREP transformational. 
Stakeholders on the margins of the consensus argued 
for providing much-needed energy in rural areas to 
bring co-benefits for the poor — but these ideas 
failed to translate into investments. 
In Nepal, narratives around the pathway to 
transformational change were more diverse and 
diffused, and priorities were very different from 
Ethiopia’s. overall, policy makers and MDBs saw 
potential for SREP to transform the country to low-
carbon growth, with co-benefits on health, education 
and employment, among others. The consensus 
focused on up scaling proven technologies such as 
small-scale hydropower projects to improve energy 
access and relieve poverty. Yet some stakeholders from 
bilateral and multilateral agencies argued for promoting 
innovative technologies such as waste-to-energy 
and solar-wind hybrid in Nepal. Diffused narratives 
translated into a mix and match of off-grid and grid-tied 
technologies in hydropower, solar and waste-to-energy 
in the investment plan. However, recent events have 
seen substantial changes in the implementation plan 
with the small hydro component now planned to be 
replaced with solar. In the absence of strong networks 
Nepal has experienced delays due to unresolved 
disagreements between actors. 
Figure 15: Actors’ views on how SREP will bring transformation in Ethiopia and Nepal
EthIoPIA Technology Diversification Co-benefits Economic growth Carbon finance
Govt- core  
Govt- line ministry 
MDB 
Private Sector  
Other-multilateral
Govt-Other
Bilateral  
NEPAl Technology Diversification Co-benefits
Economic 
growth
Low carbon 
pathway
Capacity & 
Mind set Sceptical
Govt- core   
Govt- line ministry 
MDB   
Civil Society
Other-multilateral
Govt-Other
Bilateral 
Source: Semi-structured interviews
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Development benefits 
one of the key design principles for SREP was that it 
should “seek wider economic, social and environmental 
co-benefits, such as reduced local pollution, increased 
energy security, enterprise creation, and increased 
social capital, particularly greater involvement and 
empowerment of women and other vulnerable 
groups”(CIF, 2010b). All SREP countries list poverty 
reduction, increased energy security, and job creation 
as co-benefits, but the strength of these narratives differ 
within countries. 
In Ethiopia, government, bilateral stakeholders and 
the private sector argue for achieving development by 
encouraging economic development, employment and 
job creation. Energy security is expected to sustain 
economic growth through increasing production and 
creating additional job opportunities. In Nepal a core 
group of actors from government and development 
partners feel development impacts will come from 
energy access in marginalised areas by bringing more 
opportunities for rural development (see Figure 16). 
Figure 16: Actors’ views on how SREP will bring development benefits in Ethiopia and Nepal
EthIoPIA Economic Development Job creation
Govt- core 
Govt- line ministry 
MDB
Private Sector 
Other-multilateral
Govt-Other
Bilateral 
NEPAl
Energy 
Access & 
Rural Dev.
Job creation Economic dev Poverty Reduction
Environmental 
Co-Benefits
Govt 
capacity dev
Govt- core  
Govt- line 
ministry  
MDB  
Civil Society
Govt-Other
Bilateral 
Source: Semi-structured interviews. 
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Scaling up 
SREP expects to scale up renewable energy by 
leveraging additional financing from MDBs, bilateral 
agencies/banks and from other public and private 
sources to achieve large-scale renewable energy 
impacts(CIF, 2010b). The narratives to scale up 
renewable energy are not always consistent, and various 
actor groups have diverse opinions on how PPCR will 
achieve scaling up. 
For example, government stakeholders in Ethiopia 
argue for a localisation strategy that will scale up and 
harness local capacities. Yet some stakeholders 
from government and MDBs support the increase 
of renewable energy supply into the national grid. 
MDBs and some development partners consider 
scaling up to mean replicating existing successful 
programmes and good practices. In Nepal, government 
stakeholders, development partners and the private 
sector generally consider scaling up will come from 
up scaling existing technologies, for example by 
expanding renewable technologies such as small 
hydro projects. 
Figure 17: Actors’ views on how SREP will achieve ‘scaling up’ in Ethiopia and Nepal
EthIoPIA Scale up supply
Scale up existing 
technology
Harness local 
capacity Diversification
Govt- core  
Govt- line ministry 
MDB 
Private Sector 
Civil Society 
Bilateral
NEPAl Scale up supply
Scale up 
technology
Catalyse 
Pvt sector
Replicate 
good 
practice
Rural 
energy 
access
Co-benefits
Govt- core   
Govt- line ministry 
MDB   
Private sector 
Civil Society
Bilateral 
Source: Semi-structured interviews. 
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Private sector development 
SREP aims to create an enabling environment for 
private sector engagement and to leverage investments 
in renewables. In practice, the level of private sector 
engagement is not universally high in SREP projects 
across countries. 
The private sector received a limited role in Ethiopia’s 
plan, with less than 10% of SREP funds targeting 
them. (In contrast, Nepal has a 50:50 share for public 
and private.) The prevailing narrative in Ethiopia was 
that local private firms were not up to the task of 
rolling out a large renewable energy power supply for 
the national grid. Technologies such as geothermal and 
wind are novel and deemed to require huge capital and 
technical capacity, which the current local private sector 
is lacking. government stakeholders argue that private 
sector should complement or support the activities of 
public sector and not lead or own renewable energy 
production. Yet some actors have alternate views. 
Development partners, MDBs and the private sector 
argue that the public sector doesn’t provide a level 
playing field to the private sector to invest in renewable 
industry. They believe the public sector is reluctant to 
engage the private sector on equal footing.
Some stakeholders in Nepal view the private sector 
as being at the centre of transformation. Development 
partners, donors, some government officials and private 
actors widely agreed that the public sector alone cannot 
provide the scale of investment needed to electrify 
the country. Yet some government stakeholders also 
believe that the private sector is not ready to invest in 
renewables, and may be best placed to support rather 
than lead. 
Figure 18: Actors’ views on how SREP will catalyse private sector
EthIoPIA
Public sector 
-reluctant
PS can 
complement 
public sector
PS detterred by 
risk 
PS role can be 
increased
PS SMEs can be 
engaged
Govt- core  
Govt- line 
ministry  
MDB   
Private Sector 
Civil Society 
Bilateral 
NEPAl PS can complement public sector PS deterred by risk 
PS role can be 
increased PS can bring finance
Govt- core    
Govt- line 
ministry  
MDB 
Civil Society
Private sector  
Govt-Other
Bilateral  
Source: Semi-structured interviews. 
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EthIoPIA NEPAl 
Core narratives Alternative narratives Core narratives Alternative narratives 
Transformational 
impact 
Technology 
diversification
Economic growth
Development co-
benefits
Dispersed narrative 
Transition onto a low carbon pathway, 
Bringing health, education and employment 
co-benefits
Enhancing capacities as well as change in 
mind-sets of different actors, and
Technology diversification
Development 
benefits 
Economic growth
Employment
Energy access and 
rural development 
Poverty reduction
Energy access in 
marginalised areas. 
Job creation
Health benefits 
Poverty reduction
Capacity building 
Economic 
development
Scaling up Harness and build 
local capacities 
Replicating good 
practices 
Scale up existing 
technologies 
Replicate good 
practices
Scale up supply
Private sector 
engagement
Skepticism about 
capacities of 
private sector. 
Private sector 
not yet ready but 
can complement 
public sector
Public sector is 
reluctant to engage 
private sector
Private sector can 
play increased role 
in production as 
well as financing 
Private sector can 
complement but not 
lead. 
Private sector is profit 
oriented and deterred 
by risk and lack of 
incentives 
Table 7: Summary of narratives for SREP in Ethiopia and Nepal
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8 
Incentives that 
underpin actor 
narratives and 
decisions
A wide range of incentives (see Box 3) underpin the 
discourses and the decisions made under SREP and 
PPCR. Incentives, which can include policy, economic 
and knowledge-based factors, can strengthen coalitions 
and shape national decisions on climate finance.
Dispersed narratives, on the other hand, which lack 
incentives or resource support, are less capable of 
influencing decisions. 
Drivers for PPCR decisions 
In Bangladesh, climate change vulnerability 
assessments such as evaluations of loss and damage 
from Cyclone Sidr in 2007 called for US$1.2 billion to 
rehabilitate coastal embankments. This evidence offered 
a strong knowledge incentive to invest in infrastructure. 
Existing partnerships between MDBs and the line 
departments that would plan and manage the projects 
allowed the government to rationalise the use of PPCR 
money towards projects they had expertise in. Co-
finance was available for coastal infrastructure projects 
already in the pipeline and requiring a funding top-up, 
making a strong economic case. Bangladesh’s climate 
change strategy and the NAPA provided policy support 
to take these investment decisions forward (summarised 
in Table 8). 
In Nepal, decisions were guided by two high-level 
strategic plans, the National Adaptation Programme 
of Action (NAPA) and the sectoral framework for 
adaptation in agriculture. These plans focused on 
the capacity needs of agriculture, water and climate 
information systems which prompted the government 
to make their investments. Further motivation came 
from research on water scarcity on farms and the 
Box 3. WhAt ARE 
INCENtIvES? 
For the purpose of this research, ‘incentives’ are 
understood as policy, economic and knowledge-
based incentives:
• Policy incentives refer to the existence of a policy, 
regulation or institutional mandate that supports 
discourses and decisions 
• Economic incentives refer to the availability of 
resources, funds, technologies, capacities etc. that 
strengthen decisions
• Knowledge incentives refer to the availability 
of evidence and understanding that drives 
decision making. 
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existence of poor linkages between existing forecasting 
systems and farming communities, offering a strong 
knowledge incentive. These incentives (summarised 
in Table 8) supported the case for investing in climate 
information systems.
Drivers for SREP decisions
The contrasting investment decisions made in Ethiopia 
and Nepal were guided by the different economic 
incentives the countries faced, as well as the policy 
goals and knowledge that each had available to them 
(summarised in Table 9). 
Ethiopia’s grid-based approach lined up with the 
economic incentive offered by available co-finance for 
renewable energy and policy incentives from national 
development plans that promoted a fast-growing grid 
and extra energy for export. Furthermore, policymakers 
know that climate variability is already affecting existing 
energy sources (such as hydropower), so there 
was an additional knowledge incentive to diversify 
technologies. These incentives have jointly steered 
Ethiopia to invest in large-scale grid-based electricity. 
IFC’s knowledge and existing expertise in a risk sharing 
facility with the International Bank of Ethiopia also 
encouraged IFC to replicate the model to incentivise 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the 
renewables industry. 
It was found that these incentives were also capable 
of strengthening a shared narrative and supporting 
actor coalitions for making decisions regarding 
climate finance. 
Table 8: The main incentives driving PPCR priorities in Bangladesh and Nepal
PPCR ECoNomIC 
INCENtIvE 
PolICy INCENtIvE KNoWlEDgE 
INCENtIvE 
Bangladesh • Existing pipeline projects
• Technology track record in 
infrastructure
• Existing partnerships 
between MDBs and line 
departments
• Existing climate change 
policies identified 
investment priorities – 
(BCCSAP and NAPAs)
• Vulnerability assessments 
and 
• loss and damage 
assessments
Nepal • Availability of concessional 
loans
• NAPA priority 
• Climate Change Adaptation 
Framework for Agriculture 
• Scarcity of agricultural water 
• Need for early warning 
system
• Bridge gap between 
forecasting systems and 
farming communities 
Table 9: The main incentives driving SREP priorities in Ethiopia and Nepal
SREP ECoNomIC 
INCENtIvE 
PolICy INCENtIvE KNoWlEDgE 
INCENtIvE 
Ethiopia • Availability of co-finance
• Export energy 
• Scale up supply 
• growth and transformation plan 
(gTP) 
• Ethiopia’s vision for 1 gW 
geothermal by 2020 (6%)
• Ethiopia’s vision to become a 
middle income country – 2025 
• Knowledge of impact 
of climate variability on 
existing energy source 
(hydro power). 
Nepal • Proven technologies and 
existing systems in place. 
• Energy for productive uses 
• Commercially viable 
technology. 
• Focus on energy access in rural 
areas – National Rural Renewable 
Energy Programme
• Knowledge and long-
term experience
• MDB expertise in 
other countries
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9 
Interplay and 
implications of 
political economy
our political economy analysis reflects on the actors, 
narratives and incentives and how these interact 
to generate consensus, cooperation, exclusion 
or competition, and consequently affecting how 
international climate finance is implemented nationally. 
Understanding these interactions can help policymakers 
manage expectations and stakeholder risks early on, 
prioritise equitable climate finance investments, and 
fashion a consensus from divergent ideas.
• Some actors with shared ideas and narratives form 
consensus coalitions that drive investment decisions. 
Incentives strengthen these coalitions. 
• Alternative dispersed narratives lacking support have 
less influence on decisions (exclusion), but 
• Diverging views can compete with the consensus 
and drive conflict. 
Policymakers need to ask themselves: 
• How equitable can we make decisions, given wider 
politics and relationships?
• How effectively will we be able to implement and 
deliver the consensus projects? 
• How can we ensure a broader consensus towards a 
shared vision and so reduce conflicts that interfere 
with, constrain and delay implementation? 
Investment decisions and 
the interplay of political 
economy
Decisions about both adaptation and low-carbon 
investments under the PPCR and SREP depended 
on political stakeholders coming together around a 
common understanding of development pathways 
and the objectives of PPCR and SREP. Coalitions of 
narratives, when supported by incentives, play a strong 
role in generating support for investment, as well as 
in moving from investment planning to implementation 
stages. However, ideas ‘on the fringe’ could be 
equally important but fail to influence decisions if they 
lack supportive incentives. Understanding this can 
help policymakers tie in incentives that help ensure 
investment decisions respond to all widely-held views, 
making climate finance more representative across 
stakeholder groups. Below we discuss some examples 
of how decisions have been enabled or constrained by 
the political economy they are embedded in. 
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Bangladesh decided to prioritise coastal 
infrastructure while Nepal focussed 
on capacity strengthening and climate 
information systems for farmers. 
In Bangladesh, the narrative of transformational change 
from infrastructure investments and economic growth 
prevailed. Post Cyclone Sidr vulnerability assessments 
offered a strong knowledge incentive to support this 
direction. Existing technical partnerships between 
MDBs and implementing line departments, and available 
co-finance for coastal infrastructure, made a strong 
economic case that built consensus and cooperation 
(see Figure 19). Bangladesh’s climate change strategy 
and the NAPA provided policy support to take the 
consensus position forward. 
Although views were much more diffused in Nepal, 
the decision to invest in climate information systems 
arose from a view that long-term sustainability goals 
are important and that greater capacity for climate 
adaptation will lead to transformation. Decisions were 
also incentivised by two high-level strategic plans, the 
NAPA and Nepal’s sectoral framework for adaptation in 
agriculture. Further knowledge incentives were provided 
by evidence of water scarcity on farms and of the poor 
linkages between existing forecasting systems and the 
farming community. 
Figure 19: Consensus and cooperation
Stakeholders who championed 
alternative narratives on social 
innovation in Bangladesh never gained 
a firm foothold. 
Even though these ‘champions’ came from a wide 
range of departments and institutions, they were not 
well linked through existing relationships and resources, 
and this lack of ‘coalition’ diluted their influence 
(see figure 20).
Figure 20: Alternative views
Ethiopia focussed on grid-based projects 
while Nepal focussed on energy access 
for rural areas 
The decision to invest in grid-based geothermal and 
wind energy projects in Ethiopia was driven by a 
strong consensus narrative that diversifying energy 
technologies would be transformative move that would 
drive economic growth. This was supported by a clear 
policy incentive to scale up grid based energy for 
growth under the country’s growth and Transformation 
Plan. Available co-finance from other sources as well 
as co-financing as a measure of good performance 
(within the SREP results framework) provided an 
economic incentive for investing in large-scale projects. 
Policymakers also had evidence that climate variability 
is already affecting existing energy supply. Actors with 
alternative views argued for providing much-needed 
energy in rural areas — but these ideas failed to 
influence and translate into investments. 
In Nepal, narratives around SREP’s pathway to 
transformational change were more diverse and 
diffused, and priorities were very different from 
Ethiopia’s. In the SREP investment plan these diffused 
narratives translated into a mix and match of off-grid and 
grid-tied technologies in hydropower, solar and waste-
to-energy. There has recently been substantial changes 
to the implementation plan, with the small hydro (grid-
tied) component now planned to be replaced with 
grid-tied solar. In the absence of strong networks, 
unresolved disagreements between actors has delayed 
implementation in Nepal. However, the National Rural 
Renewable Energy Plan provides a strong policy 
incentive in steering the country towards investing 
in proven technologies that enhance energy access 
in rural areas, i.e. harnessing and expanding Nepal’s 
existing national arrangements, which heavily focus on 
hydropower and biogas. There is little clarity about why 
this shift happened at the last minute5. 
Ethiopia has only a limited focus on 
private sector engagement, whereas 
the public private role is more balanced 
in Nepal. 
The private sector was assigned a limited role in 
Ethiopia’s plan with less than 10% SREP funds targeted 
to the private sector. In contrast to this, Nepal has 
allocated 50:50 shares to public and private sector. 
The prevailing narrative in Ethiopia that constrained 
investments was that local private firms were not 
prepared to roll out large-scale projects in renewables. 
This differs to the view of a number of influential 
stakeholders in Nepal who consider the private sector 
SoCIAL 
INNoVATIoN
INFRASTRUCTURE
5 The shift from small hydro to solar is fairly recent in SREPs investment plan. The implementing actors are in the process of seeking approval. As the interviews 
for this case study were undertaken last year, in 2014 before this decision was made, the cause behind this recent shift in Nepal remains unclear. 
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as the engine of change. However, other government 
stakeholders believe that private sector is not ready to 
invest in renewables, and may be best placed to support 
rather than lead. 
Implementation decisions 
and interplay of political 
economy
Where alternate views existed but were never fully 
integrated or resolved, stakeholders sometimes erected 
constraints later on. 
Reduced plans: In Bangladesh, there were plans to 
improve forests around the coastal embankments that 
are being repaired. But this side of the project has 
been cut back due to insufficient engagement, lack of 
a shared vision and an ongoing dispute between the 
implementing water development board and the forestry 
department (see figure 21).
Figure 21: Conflict
Perceived inequalities: In Nepal’s PPCR climate 
information system project those dealing with agriculture 
see their share of the resources as much less than 
that allocated to meteorology. The project is meant to 
link farmers with an early warning system for climate 
variability. A large share of resources is allocated 
for building hydro-met infrastructure, acquiring new 
technologies and capacity building within the hydro 
metrology department, with much less development 
of climate resilient technologies than the agriculture 
ministry envisaged. Such perceived inequalities could 
risk undermining later implementation (see figure 22). 
Figure 22: Competition
Delayed private sector component: In both 
Bangladesh (PPCR) and Ethiopia (SREP) the private 
sector component has been delayed as a direct 
outcome of divergent opinions between MDBs and 
government departments and ministries. The initial 
proposal in Bangladesh was for the IFC and the 
agriculture ministry to jointly implement the private 
sector component. Whilst the IFC has a specific 
mandate to work directly with the private sector, the 
ministry has been reluctant to use public funds to 
incentivise profit-orientated businesses, who they 
also deem to be lacking in capacity. Ministry staff 
also considers their own departments to have better 
outreach, infrastructure and institutions, including 
at the farmer level. Because of these differences in 
opinions and mandates, Bangladesh’s PPCR has had 
to switch its government counterpart for implementing 
a private sector component with IFC to the Ministry of 
Environment, delaying implementation. 
In Ethiopia, differences in opinion, inadequate regulatory 
incentives and differences in mandates between actors 
have delayed the implementation of the private sector 
component of SREP. IFC was aiming to replicate 
its existing good practice model of providing a risk 
sharing facility. The intention was to help SMEs access 
finance for renewables from local banks. However, 
changes in incentives such as a ‘liquidity squeeze’ 
for commercial banks (brought about by regulatory 
changes) have stalled this ambition. The IFC will not 
offer risk guarantees and other financial support in such 
circumstances. As IFC is mandated to work directly 
with a country’s private sector and outside government 
ministries and financial services, the commercial banks 
supported by IFC are forced to compete directly with 
the Ethiopian state banks, which are supported by the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia. 
These examples demonstrate how actors whose 
views diverge from the dominant consensus can 
later deter implementation even if they can’t influence 
planning decisions. 
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10 
Conclusions and 
lessons
This working paper has shared experiences of 
how international climate finance is governed and 
implemented at the country level, offering policymakers 
insight into how countries can build their own ‘climate 
finance readiness’ by understanding their internal 
political economy and using that understanding to steer 
consensus-based decision making on climate finance 
investments. We provide learnings from both national 
experiences of governing CIFs as well as broader 
learnings from the political economy analysis. 
Lessons from CIF 
governance processes at the 
national level
From national institutionalisation and 
governance of CIFs 
• Country ownership could go beyond the 
involvement of a few lead national actors: 
National ownership is strongly evident from the role 
of core and implementing ministries in decision 
making in all three case countries; and, in Bangladesh 
and Nepal, from the availability of government co-
finance. But leadership by a few dominant players 
may inadvertently exclude wider interests. Inadequate 
multi-stakeholder representation in national dialogues 
could constrain a national vision for climate 
resilience. Achieving broader country ownership may 
require taking such dialogues beyond information 
dissemination exercises to enter into dialogue and 
gather input as well. 
• Seeking investment proposals from those at the 
decision making fringe: our analysis shows that 
line ministries and departments that were previously 
involved in implementing climate-related programmes 
are the main recipients of CIFs resources. While 
an established network between line departments 
and MDB counterparts helps minimise costs and 
allows financial leveraging, and topping up existing 
pipelines may make economic sense, integrating 
climate resilience into other sectoral ministries is also 
important in order to steer transformational change. 
This may require creating incentives and avenues to 
integrate alternative views by providing resource and 
policy support to ministries such as health and social 
welfare as well as to sub-national and civil society 
actors as proposals are developed. 
• Institutional coordination and consensus 
is the core of effective implementation: 
Investment plans have not always been successful in 
catalysing good coordination within government and 
between government and MDBs. This has hindered 
implementation and allowed conflict and competition 
to persist. Common understanding about interests 
and incentives can help with good coordination that is 
crucial for ensuring effective implementation.
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Investment plans
• Flexible planning cycles customised to country 
readiness makes sense. However, some 
preparatory element is vital to: 
(a) Define and divide roles and responsibilities for co-
ordinated delivery of climate actions, and
(b) Manage expectations, remove information 
asymmetries and establish a process of extended 
dialogue that will ensure the stakeholder interest 
needed for uninterrupted programme delivery. The 
extent of planning required (whether detailed or 
basic) should be a country’s own decision. 
• Opportunities can be sought for choosing 
transformational projects. CIF programmes in 
some cases have incentivised ‘business as usual’ 
investments instead of achieving transformational 
investments. For example, although there is an 
undeniable need for infrastructure investment in 
Bangladesh, such investments could have been 
complemented with socially innovative projects. 
Perverse incentives that support short-termism should 
also be removed. For example using co-financing 
as a measure of good performance can discourage 
decision makers from selecting projects that are 
unlikely to attract co-finance or demonstrate results in 
the short–term future. 
• Identify ways to address private sector 
engagement challenges. Private sector 
components have struggled to take off, sometimes 
because of lack of public sector support and the 
inflexible institutional mandates of implementing 
MDBs. Countries need to prepare more thoroughly 
to design better private sector initiatives. This may 
require increasing awareness of programme ambition 
among both public and private sectors before 
leaping into investment decisions. Clarity around 
which part of the private sector is being targeted 
(local, international, small or large) and precisely 
how it could invest, would provide reassurance to 
all parties, and potentially encourage more focused 
actions. International financial intermediaries 
could be mandated to work in coordination with 
governments, rather than alongside them, especially 
in ‘developmental state’ economies where the private 
sector is deeply regulated by government. This may 
mean tailoring leadership depending on the level 
of state involvement and the readiness of national 
financial intermediaries. Where state institutions are 
‘ready’, funds may be channelled through financial 
institutions such as national development banks.
Lessons from analysing the 
political economy
our political economy analysis show how like-minded 
coalitions support symbiotic decision making, while 
alternative coalitions with limited resources and 
dispersed knowledge are pushed to the margins. 
Divergent coalitions compete for power and 
hinder action. 
• Actors with shared ideas form coalitions that support 
investment decisions
• Incentives — economic rewards, policy goals and 
compelling evidence — can strengthen these decision-
making coalitions
• Dispersed stories and incentives are less able to 
influence decisions
• Nevertheless, stakeholders with divergent views can 
hamper action.
Understanding the political economy of climate 
finance decisions will help national policymakers 
drive consensus decisions that can be implemented 
efficiently and effectively without later encountering 
obstacles erected by stakeholders’ divergent opinions. 
A deeper understanding of the political economy can 
also help ensure investment decisions respond to 
all widely-held views, making climate finance more 
representative across stakeholder groups.
governments can learn to use political economy 
thinking in different contexts, such as harnessing strong 
coalitions, identifying ways to integrate marginalised 
views, and negotiating and managing expectations 
of those who may otherwise disrupt programme 
implementation (see figure 23).
The proliferation of climate finance initiatives over the 
past decade has led to changes in incentives and 
governance structures within recipient countries, 
making such an understanding particularly timely, not 
least because the green Climate Fund (gCF) will 
become operational later this year. 
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The case studies and lessons learnt suggest the 
following guidelines that offer lessons for country 
governments and climate finance initiatives such as 
the gCF.
• Consider the context of narratives and 
incentives. Each proposal for climate-resilient 
development will have proponents and dissenters 
driven by the ideologies, incentives and resources in 
play. To steer towards a broadly supported consensus 
and avoid time-consuming disputes, governments 
and development partners will need to be bold and 
find pathways to successfully navigate the political 
economy at hand, often by reshaping incentives. 
governments and development partners can make 
more effective policies by actively seeking out and 
integrating more diverse views.
• Be purposeful with the process: adequate 
attention should be given to the sequence of 
decisions and who is represented in the policy 
process. Ensuring that line ministries are engaged 
in decisions that directly affect them will increase 
ownership and cooperation during implementation. 
• Recognise patterns of coalitions (competitive 
or cooperative) and dissent. Where actors share 
a vision, channelling resources in that direction 
can generate synergistic actions. If an alternative 
view exists at the margins, seek policy or economic 
incentives for integrating it into the consensus. Look 
for dissent that may pose obstacles down the line 
in order to negotiate and manage expectations (see 
figure 23).
Where actors’ views are divergent an 
understanding of these elements will allow 
negotiation and management of expectations 
early on, preventing future hurdles.
Where alternate views are marginalised 
identify avenues to consider and integrate 
views by providing resources and policy 
support. 
Where actors have shared views resources 
can strengthen consensus and bring synergies 
of actions. 
Address competing or 
conflicting coalitions
Negotiate to manage 
expectations
Integrate alternative/ 
marginalised views
Include ideas which may  
have dispersed resources
Harness coalitions of 
consensus
Support actors with shared ideas, 
resources, knowledge 
Figure 23: How to harness the political economy using a consensus ladder
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Appendix 1: 
Investment projects 
of Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Ethiopia in PPCR 
and SREP 
PPCR investment choices in 
Bangladesh
The government of Bangladesh (goB) chose SPCR 
priority projects from amongst the 44 priority themes 
detailed in the BCCSAP and NAPA. It focused 
predominantly in coastal zones and prioritised three 
investment projects and two technical assistance 
projects in its SPCR.
This programmatic approach addresses the strategic 
needs of Bangladesh’s extremely vulnerable coastal 
belt. A joint agreement with the World Bank will help 
rebuild embankments while ADB will help improve 
infrastructure within embankment areas. Investment 
decisions considered institutions’ comparative 
advantages and track records in such investments. 
A strong focus on infrastructure-type investments 
over softer investments (such as capacity building 
or mainstreaming) is also evident. But Bangladesh 
had already initiated capacity strengthening via 
the BCSSAP. 
1. Promoting climate resilient 
agriculture and food security 
(MDB: IFC)
The project aims to catalyse private sector involvement 
in adaptive agriculture scaling up climate resilient 
varieties of rice and crops, providing efficient irrigation 
systems and developing early warning systems for 
farming communities. The focus is on 12 coastal polder 
areas with US£3 million for technical assistance and 
US$10 million in concessional loans. The project’s main 
drivers were:
• Coastal area vulnerability to climate change impacts, 
such as saline intrusion
• Agriculture and food security is one of the main 
thematic priorities under Bangladesh’s climate 
change strategy
• The MDB partner, IFC, has a strong track record of 
investing in agriculture projects as well as working 
experience with the private seed companies and 
Ngos (for example, BRAC – Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee)
The programme seeks to provide: 
• Advice for farmers and the private sector
• Capacity building for banks on better agricultural 
lending within climate contexts
• Capacity building for farmers on producing improved 
seed varieties as well as on basic business literacy
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• An evaluation of market potential for low cost climate 
resilient housing in the polder areas. 
Based on extensive stakeholder consultation, IFC 
decided to focus on one major food staple (rice) and 
a few commercial crops (sunflower, oil and pulses) in 
the 12 coastal polder regions. The project tries to strike 
a balance between providing incentives to the private 
sector to invest in commercial crops as well as ensuring 
food security. The programme was originally meant 
to be implemented in partnership with the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s Department of Agricultural Extension 
(DAE) and the Bangladesh Meteorological Department. 
However, due to ideological differences on private 
sector engagement in agriculture sector, the programme 
is now being implemented through the environment 
ministry. There were two main reasons for the fall out: 
• IFC has a mandate to deliver its project directly 
through the private sector. Bangladesh’s public 
sector on the other hand is unenthusiastic about 
expenditures incurred to incentivise the private sector, 
particularly in agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture 
feels that its own channels through Department of 
Agriculture extension can do this so they shouldn’t 
need private sector to channel services directly to 
the farmers.
• There is also adversarial feeling between public and 
private sector. For example, public sector barriers 
deter private investment in new and risky areas 
such as climate resilient agriculture (Rai, 2013a). 
Any new seed variety (e.g. saline resistant varieties) 
must be released by the public sector. So the private 
sector overwhelmingly relies on the government for 
developing new seed varieties and there are very few 
private research and development laboratories. This 
restricts private sector direct access to new varieties 
and limits their role to supplying, not developing, 
agricultural inputs. 
As the project moves from planning to implementation, 
greater alignment is needed between support for the 
private sector and ongoing government work. greater 
interaction is needed with government to ensure better 
outreach and replication of technology on the ground. 
The Department of Agriculture has strong infrastructure, 
institutions and resources reaching down to the farmer 
level. Without their involvement, delivery of this project 
may not be sustained. 
2: Coastal Embankments Improvement 
and Afforestation (MDB: World Bank)
The Coastal Embankments Improvement Project (CEIP) 
is a blended programme with US£ 25 million financing 
from CIFs and co-financing from IDA credit worth 
US$300 million. This project seeks to respond to the 
extensive coastal flooding during the annual monsoon 
and use coastal water management infrastructure to 
protect the local people and environment. This large-
scale project will be implemented in phases covering 
following main components:
1. Rehabilitate climate resilient embankments through 
climate proofing of polders. 
2. Rehabilitate or build water management related 
structures within polders. 
3. Finance coastal afforestation alongside 
embankments to ensure longevity and greater 
protection. The project has a social forestry 
component, with 5 million USD funding from the 
PPCR focusing on indigenous species. 
4. Implementation of a social and environmental 
framework plan. This includes re-settling people 
near polders. 
5. Monitoring and evaluation systems to monitor the 
project, particularly sea level rise. 
6. A participatory monitoring system where Ngos 
and local authorities will be involved to implement 
the social forestry and the monitoring component of 
the project. 
The MDB partner is the World Bank. Most components 
are being implemented by the Bangladesh Water 
Development Board coastal embankment unit. The 
MoEF’s Forest Department was meant to implement 
a forestry component, but this has been reduced. 
Initially, the plan was to plant one hectare of forest 
across all polders but a review by BWDB revealed 
how, during cyclone surges, big trees get uprooted 
and further damage the polder infrastructure. 
Inadequate coordination between BWDB and the 
Forest Department in early stages has also hindered 
this component. Because most of the land belongs 
to Forest Department, negotiations have proven to be 
difficult. Poor coordination between line departments 
is recognised as constraint across many CIF 
programmes(ICF, 2014). 
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Primary drivers for prioritising CEIP within the 
investment plan:
• Broad nation-wide decision to address coastal 
vulnerability government decided to prioritise 
the coastal areas, which needed US$1.2 billion of 
rehabilitation after Cyclone Sidr. 
• Available co-financing After Cyclone Sidr, the 
World Bank designed a US$ 300 million multi-phase 
project to rehabilitate embankments along the coast. 
PPCR funds were to be integrated as co-financing 
within this pipeline programme. Bangladesh has 
been investing in coastal embankments for many 
decades, but a study revealed that the height of the 
embankments will need to be increased significantly 
to protect the inland community from climate 
induced tidal inundation. The Coastal Embankment 
Improvement Project seeks to make regular 
development climate-resilient development.
• Comparative advantage and experience of 
MDB and government counterparts in coastal 
infrastructure development The prioritisation and 
project selection process evaluated the comparative 
advantages of institutions working in the coastal 
sector, what projects already existed under which 
ministries, and different ministries experiences and 
expertise in project implementation. 
3: Coastal Climate Resilient Water 
Supply Sanitation and Infrastructure 
Improvement (MDB: ADB)
This investment component seeks to ‘climate proof’ 
existing infrastructure, or build new climate-resilient 
infrastructure. There are two investment components. 
The first is a ‘Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure 
Project’ that seeks to build resilience for coastal roads, 
jetties, schools and urban drainage systems. The PPCR 
fund is US$30 million (US$20 million loan, US$10 
million grant) while rest is leveraged from other sources. 
For example, KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) 
is supporting US$8 million of grants for the coastal 
green project; the government of Bangladesh has 
contributed US$31 million in grants, of which US$16 
million is for restoring the livelihoods of coastal fishing 
communities and the remainder is credit support by the 
ADB. Municipal governments, the Local government 
Engineering Department and the Department of 
Public Health and Engineering (DPHE) will execute 
the project. Capacity building is embedded in all 
project components.
The second investment component, the ‘Coastal Town 
Infrastructure Project’, seeks to provide basic services 
such as water supply and sanitation, and to restore 
livelihoods in coastal towns. The US$117 million 
required is funded by PPCR (US$10 m credit and 
US$20 m grant), by the government of Bangladesh 
(US$23.2 m), and through grant support from Bill and 
Melinda gates foundation (US$1.5 m grant) and credit 
support from ADB (US$52 m). 
Concerns around prioritised investment projects 
(see details in Box 4)
• Decision making: Although various actors 
were engaged in PPCR planning consultations, 
investment planning is largely carried out by key focal 
ministries (finance and environment), implementing 
MDBs (ADB, WB and IFC) and their government 
counterparts (LgED, BWDB). 
 Yet many others have influential roles to play in 
climate-resilient development within Bangladesh. 
Actors such as other government departments 
(disaster management, planning ministry, agriculture 
ministry); other multilaterals (UNDP) and civil society 
have concerns about investment planning but are not 
directly involved in shaping PPCR implementation.
• Infrastructure investment vs. social innovation: 
Bangladesh undoubtedly requires enormous 
investment in coastal infrastructure. However, some 
stakeholders, including the non-implementing arm of 
the environment ministry, the disaster management 
ministry and UNDP, consider strengthening old 
infrastructure a ‘business as usual’ solution. PPCR 
is a pilot project and the prioritisation process could 
have complemented such measures with innovative 
ideas in disaster risk reduction, climate smart 
agriculture technology development, community-
based adaptation, social protection or measures to 
mitigate population displacement. The SPCR could 
have also focused on innovative and transformational 
pilots that can be scaled-up to add value to the 
existing activities.
• Developmental impacts: Coastal projects could 
be better targeted to benefit the most vulnerable. For 
example, they could target coastal populations living 
beyond embankments, as these populations remain 
unprotected from cyclones. 
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PPRC investment choices in 
Nepal
Nepal has chosen a multi-sectoral (water, food security, 
and ecosystem balance) approach in prioritising and 
implementing PPCR. In the design stage, Nepal tried to 
align PPCR with the NAPA formulation process, using 
the same thematic working groups to work on planning 
and prioritising components. Some people debated the 
necessity of a completely new programme and it was 
decided to create the SPCR by incorporating NAPA 
objectives and adding additional aspects such as a 
private sector component. 
After a series of negotiations the SPCR outlined five 
investment projects to be supported. The PPCR 
sub-committee agreed to these projects in principle 
in June 2011 and all four investment projects and one 
technical assistance project are now in various stages 
of development (goN, 2012). 
1: Building Climate Resilience of 
Watersheds in Mountain Eco- Regions 
(MDB: ADB)
The first investment project aims to make vulnerable 
freshwater resources in mountain eco-regions 
more resilient to climate change in order to improve 
agricultural productivity. NAPA has partly directed this 
need to protect watersheds and water resources. The 
implementing MDB is the ADB and the government 
counterpart is Department of Soil Conservation and 
Water Management (DSCWM). The project has 
four components: 
• Participatory planning for watershed management
• Implementing watershed management plans in 
priority watersheds
• Using water more productively
• Incorporating lessons on improving access and 
reliability of water resources in vulnerable mountain 
regions into country programmes.
2: Building Resilience to Climate-
Related Hazards (MDB: World Bank)
The second investment project aims to build community 
resilience to climate related hazards by supporting early 
warning systems and weather forecasting for improved 
farming practices. The programme will also establish 
climate risk insurance mechanisms for the agricultural 
community. The project is being implemented by the 
World Bank and Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and 
Meteorology (within MoSTE, the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Environment) and the Ministry of 
Agricultural Development (MoAD). The project has 
four parts: 
• Institutional strengthening, capacity building and 
implementation support for the Department of 
Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM)
• Modernisation of observation networks and early 
warning systems
• Enhancing the DHM’s service delivery system, and 
• Creating an agriculture management information 
system (AMIS). 
DHM is responsible for the first three parts and MoAD is 
responsible for the fourth. Both the early warning system 
and AMIS were NAPA priorities. Nepal lacks hydro 
metrological stations for real time hydrometric data. 
Construction and modernisation of hydro metrological 
stations was therefore prioritised by all ministries. Early 
warning systems were also seen as an easy option that 
could be funded through available concessional loans. 
In the past, farmers have not used DHM services to 
support their agriculture decisions. Thus, the Ministry 
of Agricultural Development has been tasked with filling 
this gap through AMIS. AMIS will provide agriculture 
related information such as weather, climate data, 
agriculture technologies etc. to stakeholders, including 
planners and scientists, through a media portal. A 
subsequent task will be to provide agro-advisory 
services to farmers, based on weather forecasts. 
Despite being a policy priority, the project has 
generated inter-departmental discontent because 
of the way projects have received priority during the 
implementation stages. Around US$25 million is 
allocated for building hydro- metrological infrastructure, 
acquiring new technologies and capacity building within 
DHM, while US$1.2 million is allocated for capacity 
building by MoAD. Both Nepal’s National Agriculture 
and Research Centre (NARC) and MoAD view that 
as an unequal allocation. The project now focuses 
on disseminating information to farmers by linking 
them into early warning systems, with much less of 
the development of climate-resilient technologies that 
MoAD had envisaged. 
Technical assistance: Mainstreaming Climate 
Change Risk Management in Development (MDB 
partner: ADB)
The technical assistance project offers support to 
integrate climate change risk management into planning 
and practices. It also supports work to develop and 
apply knowledge management tools in response to 
climate change. The programme has developed a 
training package on community-based assessments 
of climate change vulnerability. The programme will 
also document traditional and indigenous adaptation 
practices in Nepal. This technical assistance is being 
Political economy of international climate finance | NavigatiNg decisioNs iN PPcR aNd sReP
50     www.iied.org
Box 4: ImPlICAtIoNS oF PPCR DECISIoNS: SummARy oF 
KEy mESSAgES 
Flexible programme cycles: The process of SPCR 
development is flexible and customised to country 
readiness. Both Nepal and Bangladesh had well-
pronounced climate change priorities through its 
NAPA and climate change strategies which allowed 
Bangladesh to leapfrog phase 1. Some preparatory 
element is although vital to: (a) define and divide 
roles and responsibilities for co-ordinated delivery of 
climate actions; and (b) manage expectations, remove 
information asymmetries and establish a process 
of extended dialogue to ensure stakeholder interest 
for uninterrupted programme delivery. The extent of 
planning required (whether detailed or basic) should 
be country’s own decision. 
Programmatic investment planning: 
Programmatic investment planning is an innovation 
within CIFs. Bangladesh’s plan focussed on 
programmatic geographic investments in the 
coastal areas of the country. Nepal on the other 
hand has prioritised agriculture priorities in its 
programmatic sector planning. Although both defined 
‘programmatic’ differently, programmatic proposals 
are uniformly translated into projects with capacity 
building and mainstreaming support. 
Decisions in Investment planning: Planning 
consultations are although inclusive; investment 
planning decisions are strongly driven by a group 
of core focal ministries, multilateral development 
banks and their traditional government country parts. 
Bangladesh prioritised coastal infrastructure because 
of available co-financing from pipelines (given the 
enormous scale of finance required and PPCR funds 
were relatively small), existing partnerships and 
investment experience of MDBs and line departments 
in coastal infrastructure development. 
Transformational projects: PPCR seeks to achieve 
transformational shift through climate responsive 
investments. Across the PPCR countries some 
projects may be clearly transformational while others 
lack the sense of transformation. Investment in age 
old infrastructure in Bangladesh lack the spirit of 
transformation, although the large scale requirement 
of infrastructure investment in coastal areas is 
undeniable, some consider it no more than business 
as usual development. Stakeholders feel PPCR as 
a pilot programme could have been more bold and 
innovative by complementing infrastructure investment 
with socially innovative projects.  
Private sector investment challenges: PPCR 
seeks to catalyse private sector in climate adaptation 
activities. Public finance is used to remove barriers 
to private sector investment. In Both Bangladesh 
and Nepal, this component has struggled in effective 
delivery. While IFC has mandate to deliver projects 
directly through the private sector, government 
stakeholders are less positive about public 
expenditure incurred to incentivise the private sector 
in the agriculture sector. Capacities of private sector 
are also weak in both countries, often limited to 
agricultural input marketing. government departments 
have better outreach, infrastructure, and institutions 
down to the farmer’s level. Inadequate coordination 
between government counterparts, IFC and the 
private sector could hinder effective delivery as 
countries move towards implementation in these 
countries. There is also an adversarial role between 
public and private sector. For example, in agriculture, 
public sector barriers deter private investment in new 
and risky areas such as climate resilient agriculture 
(Rai, 2013b). 
Moving from planning to implementation: 
Inter–government coordination: as countries 
move from planning to implementation, coordination 
between executing departments will be crucial in 
effective delivery of PPCR. In Bangladesh, PPCR has 
not entirely managed to achieve inter departmental 
cooperation. The forestry component within the 
coastal embankment project has been reduced 
because of insufficient cooperation between water 
development board and forestry department (who are 
the primary owners of land around embankments). 
Unequal allocation of resources between the 
hydro met component (DHM) and the agriculture 
dissemination component (NARC and agriculture 
ministry) during the implementation phase has 
also caused discontent amongst the agriculture 
departments in Nepal who were seeking for more 
concrete investment in climate resilient agriculture 
technologies. 
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implemented by the ADB and MoSTE. In addition, this 
project is working to build coordination among various 
other climate change projects. Nepal’s Climate Change 
Project Coordination Committee is the result. 
3: Building Climate Resilient 
Communities Through Private Sector 
Participation (MDB: IFC)
Private sector involvement was not a priority in Nepal’s 
NAPA, and has been added into the SPCR. This project 
aims to address market barriers that discourage private 
sector and local financial institutions from investing 
in climate change adaptation actions and products. 
It seeks private collaboration in climate resilient 
agriculture, hydropower and low-cost climate-resilient 
housing. By May 2013, four lead firms for agri-business 
had been selected and a MoU signed to provide 
extension services to farmers. The project has three 
main parts: 
• Public and private sector collaboration that 
enhances food security through promoting climate 
resilient agriculture
• ‘Climate proofing’ selected vulnerable infrastructure, 
such as private hydropower stations, and 
• A feasibility study for low-cost climate-resilient 
housing. 
Although decision makers agreed on the importance 
of the private sector in addressing climate change and 
the need to build its capacities to help build a climate-
resilient environment, there seems to be confusion on 
what exactly the private sector’s role will be and how 
business will be incentivised in low-profit adaptation 
projects. 
As in Bangladesh, the IFC directly implements the 
private sector component of the SPCR in collaboration 
with agriculture businesses. There is little coordination 
with agriculture departments and ministries, raising 
concerns around the project’s effective delivery. The 
government has strong on the ground experience, and 
the disconnect between the government and the IFC/
private sector may be a significant missed opportunity. 
4: Enhancing Climate Resilience of 
Endangered Species (MDB: World Bank) 
The last investment project aims to address the risks 
climate change poses to endangered wildlife. Nepal’s 
NAPA has prioritised forest and biodiversity issues 
and this investment project is intended to address 
those priorities. It was not on the original list of PPCR 
priorities but was included after much debate. The 
project is being led by Nepal’s Ministry of Forest and 
Soil Conservation and the implementing bank is the 
World Bank. 
SREP investment choices in 
Ethiopia
A significant part of Ethiopia’s population is rural, 
has limited grid-based electricity and depends on 
agriculture. SREP has approved US$50 million (96 
per cent grant and 4 per cent loan) for three renewable 
energy projects: geothermal, wind and a clean energy 
SME facility. The investments seek to accelerate 
electrification within the country by scaling up available 
sources of renewable energy. A key process during 
the planning stage, developed by national stakeholders 
and the MDBs, was establishing screening criteria for 
potential SREP projects (goE, 2011): 
• Strategic relevance (i.e. to Ethiopia’s growth and 
Transformation Plan and Climate Resilient green 
Economy commitment) 
• gender equality promotion
• Beneficial environmental impact 
• Potential to scale-up 
• Cost effectiveness 
• Potential for new direct beneficiaries, and 
• Implementation readiness. 
The first draft of the Investment Plan identified eight 
possible activities. Whilst all were aligned with SREP’s 
programming guidelines, the number had to be 
reduced to minimise transaction costs; in other words, 
to finance a small number of projects with significant 
scale-up potential, rather than many small projects 
(goE, 2011). Since Ethiopia does not have a central 
renewable energy policy, further selection criteria had to 
be developed. 
1: The Aluto Langano Geothermal 
project (MDB: AfDB) 
Conventionally, Ethiopia has relied strongly on 
hydropower, but climate variability’s impact on 
hydropower reveals a strong need to diversify. The 
Aluto Langano geothermal project seeks to scale up a 
pilot from 7MW to 75MW energy output, as part of the 
country’s ambition to produce up to 1 gW energy from 
geothermal by 2030 (IRENA, 2014). By investing in 
geothermal, Ethiopia seeks to connect additional power 
to the national grid and potentially export a surplus to 
neighbouring countries. 
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SREP funds are being used to expand the project 
activities and leverage additional finance. Around 26 
million US$ of SREP funds will be supplemented 
with co-finance from the government of Ethiopia and 
partnering MDBs. The Ministry of Mines (MoM) is 
executing the project in partnership with the AfDB. The 
Iceland development agency and Japanese government 
are providing technical consultancy support. The project 
intends to:
• Explore, drill and build capacity for construction of 75 
MW of geothermal electricity
• Develop a long-term strategy for exploiting geothermal 
resources in Ethiopia
• Exhibit commercial and technical viability of 
geothermal technology in the country to scale up 
future investments, and
• Develop investable projects in geothermal to achieve 
Ethiopia’s vision for 1 gW geothermal by 2030 (CIF, 
2012b, IRENA, 2014). 
2: Assela Wind Farm  
(MDB: World Bank)
The Assela Wind Farm aims to generate 100 MW 
of energy. The project was selected to complement 
an existing hydropower system and to support 
stable supply during months when hydropower is 
unpredictable. Ethiopia could generate up to 100 gW 
of wind power. However the technology is yet to be 
established. SREP financing intends the Assela project 
to serve as a proving ground for future investments 
by establishing efficacy and affordability within 
Ethiopia. The project is being implemented by EEPCo 
in partnership with the World Bank. The funds will 
invest in: 
• 100 MW of wind generation capacity 
• Local capacities and manufacturing, which will help 
reduced technology costs in the country. 
The seed money of $50 million from SREP is expected 
to receive co-finance worth $230 million from the 
Ethiopian government and other MDBs. 
The ambitious SREP plan to scale up renewable energy 
from wind and geothermal is strongly driven by the 
national growth and Transformation Plan (gTP), which 
seeks to achieve middle-income country status by 2025. 
3: The SME Risk Mitigation facility 
(MDB: IFC)
SREP Ethiopia’s private sector engagement comes 
through the Clean Energy SME Capacity Building 
and Investment Facility, a US$4 million project to 
support greater energy access and develop the off-
grid renewable market. The programme has two 
distinct aspects:
• It intends to build market players’ capacity through a 
technical assistance component that aims to ‘skill up’ 
women-run SMEs and to remove barriers for suppliers 
of clean energy products such as home-based cook 
stoves, mini grids or solar home systems. Funds 
will also support banks to develop their capacity for 
assessing the risks of investing in SMEs. 
• A financial component funds risk-sharing agreements 
with local banks to encourage ‘risky renewables 
lending’, particularly for new manufacturing facilities 
and SMEs. Risk sharing will encourage local private 
banks to provide loans to local SMEs in the renewable 
energy sector. Financial support is expected to be 
directed towards SMEs that invest in improved cook 
stoves, solar home systems and lighting devices.
IFC has an existing risk-sharing facility with NIB 
International Bank of Ethiopia to help coffee 
cooperatives and SMEs access finance. The risk-
sharing agreements have been successful in unlocking 
finance for farmers and also incentivising private banks 
to learn and engage with SMEs. Through the SREP 
component, IFC was aiming to replicate the existing 
good practice model with NIB and two other banks. 
However, local financial banks are experiencing a 
‘liquidity squeeze’ in the market because of interest 
rate changes brought about by regulatory changes, 
and in such circumstances the IFC cannot offer risk 
guarantees and other financial support. 
Also, the IFC is mandated to work directly with a 
country’s private sector, where it plays a key role in 
enabling a catalytic environment and ensures strong 
fiduciary standards in countries where public sector 
intermediaries are not yet ready to directly engage. But 
in developing economies the National Development 
Bank may play a key role in dealing with state as 
well as private companies (IFC, 2014, IFC, 2013). In 
Ethiopia, the IFC’s mandate to work outside government 
ministries and financial services forces it to compete 
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directly with the Ethiopian state banks. The overarching 
authority of DBE and its relatively secure financial 
position gives it a significant advantage. In this context, 
it is worth asking if an institution with a mandate to work 
with the government, rather than alongside it, would 
be more appropriate. Furthermore, although the IFC 
aims to nurture private sector engagement in novel 
and risky areas, the institution also seeks to achieve 
viability from investment, and the Ethiopian experience 
demonstrates its unwillingness to step into uncertain 
financial situations. 
Other investments
The second tier of SREP includes projects that will be 
implemented by funds from SREP’s reserve fund. In 
october 2012, the CIF Forum decided to allocate the 
reserve fund for private sector engagement. Ethiopia 
has allocated US$19.5 million for programmes to 
develop the Tendaho geothermal field and expand and 
rehabilitate the Sor small hydropower plant.
Primary drivers for grid-based investments 
in Ethiopia
• Policy ambition: The growth and Transformation 
Plan (gTP) laid out ambitious policy objectives to 
meet the growing demand for energy in the country 
through sufficient and reliable power supply that 
meets international standards. The gTP has plans 
to continue construction of hydroelectric power 
plants and deploy other renewable energy generation 
projects, expanding, strengthening and modernising 
the existing transmission and distribution lines to 
provide improved access to rural villages all over the 
country and to reduce power losses to international 
benchmark levels (MoFED, 2009). 
• Export energy: gTP also lays out Ethiopia’s ambition 
to export clean energy to neighbouring countries 
(MoFED, 2009, MoWE, 2011).
• Diversify energy mix: Diversifying the energy mix, 
which thus far has predominantly been hydro-power, 
is another key objective of SREPs Investment Plan 
(goE, 2013). 
In summary, it was fundamental that the planning 
of SREP operations in Ethiopia dovetailed with the 
existing development aspirations and brought together 
the disparate strategic objectives, priorities and vision 
for development of renewables contained in various 
documents (goE, 2011). 
Concerns around decisions
• Scale up of energy for export: This notion of 
exporting energy is reiterated several times throughout 
the SREP Investment Plan. Whilst this objective is 
in keeping with the pre-existing policy framework 
in Ethiopia, development partners (Switzerland) 
raised concerns that SREP resources must primarily 
enhance domestic development through energy 
access and security, and that electricity export fails 
to genuinely enhance growth within Ethiopia. At the 
SREP sub-committee meeting in May 2012, Ethiopia 
defended the proposed export, stating that SREP 
funds will be for diversification of energy in the 
country and power generated with SREP funding will 
be used locally. Ethiopia insisted it had identified its 
overall electricity demand growth, which it based on 
the electricity demand growth of its domestic and 
export markets. Correspondingly, it had prepared its 
generation expansion programme to meet expected 
electricity demand.
• Large-scale infrastructure and poverty 
reduction: Development partners further contended 
that the focus on the large-scale Aluto Langano 
geothermal and Assela Wind Power projects did 
not directly address poverty alleviation or adequately 
involve the private sector (Switzerland, 2012). 
The government of Ethiopia contended that the 
Investment Plan did indeed comply with the principles, 
objectives and criteria as specified in the design 
documents and programming modalities (goE, 2013).
• Co-financing from projects: SREP investments 
are intended to leverage financing from other 
sources at the ratio of 1:4. Leveraging is often used 
interchangeably with co-financing in SREP decisions. 
But leveraging implies catalysing new money whereas 
co-finance implies already committed funds from 
non-CIF sources. Ethiopia expects to raise around 
US$450 million in co-financing for the country within 
its large-scale infrastructure investments such as 
wind and geothermal. This ability to raise co-finance 
or committed money has encouraged investments 
in large-scale wind and geothermal infrastructure. In 
terms of leveraging finance from private sector, only 
10 per cent of funds across all SREP countries is 
likely to come from the private sector (ICF, 2013). 
Ethiopia in fact doesn’t expect any finance to be 
leveraged from private sector. 
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SREP investment choices in 
Nepal
SREPs investment plans across countries have 
focussed on grid-based renewable energy supply, 
with the exception of Nepal, which has ambitions for 
energy access projects. Nepal received US$40 million 
to invest in scaling up renewables within the country. 
The country’s SREP investment programme seeks to 
combine investment projects and capacity building by: 
• Leveraging additional finance from development 
partners and the private sector
• Making private lending through commercial banks for 
renewable energy products a mainstream expectation
• Scaling up small hydro projects 
• Bringing co-benefits such as reduced emissions, 
productive use of energy, and empowerment of 
women, children and vulnerable communities, and
• Establishing a single mechanism through a Central 
Renewable Energy fund (CREF) to channel credit, 
subsidies and technical assistance for renewables 
and to help AEPC become the single agency for 
projects up to 10MW in the country. 
The Nepal SREP investment plan intends to fund 
four different energy technologies: small hydropower, 
mini/micro-hydropower, solar PV and extended 
biogas (CIF 2011). In making this decision, the 
government had to balance the objectives of several key 
stakeholder groups: 
• The manufacturers of micro/mini hydro, solar and 
biogas energy wanted SREP support for projects 
using their power sources. 
• The banks had an interest in gaining more resources 
and creditworthiness, and were generally leaning 
towards grid-based projects that have more proven 
commercially viable than remote off-grid projects in 
rural areas. 
• The government wanted to incorporate SREP into 
its overall renewable energy planning and to adopt 
a new renewable energy policy and its own support 
programme (Peoples Hydropower, PHP). 
• The Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) was mostly 
concerned about grid stability and the rising electricity 
demand. It preferred larger, grid-based renewable 
energy systems. 
The government and the MDB-joint mission tried, 
and to a large degree succeeded, in balancing these 
different objectives and interests in the following 
investment projects. 
1: Small hydropower private sector 
component (MDB: ADB and IFC) 
ADB and IFC are jointly implementing Nepal’s SREP 
small hydropower component, which aims to create an 
enabling environment for the private sector to invest 
in grid-connected small hydro. US$20 million will be 
used to provide financing and advisory services to 
develop and test commercially viable small hydropower 
projects. The project will build capacities of local banks 
and demonstrate a viable investment environment for 
the private sector to invest in renewable technologies. 
The programme expects to leverage around US$93.4 
million in additional financing from private sector and 
other partners, once the private sector is mobilised 
to invest in the renewables sector. The programme 
is directly implemented by the MDBs and the private 
commercial banks. The project is expected to boost 
the grid capacity by 50 MW. Rather than provide direct 
subsidies, the programme will provide subsidised, long 
tenure loans to commercial banks, which will then lend 
on to commercial hydropower developers. Loans are 
preferred to direct subsidies as they encourage financial 
services to adopt good practices for risk management 
and lending to future projects.
Technical assistance and guarantees will be agreed 
with lending institutions, with the addition of foreign 
exchange risk support to banks to support market 
development. The initial public support of US$20 million 
could leverage the desired ratio of up to 1:4 from private 
finance, although no firm commitments have yet been 
made. The government is sceptical about using loans 
to subsidise the private sector. This, and lack of clarity 
on how private sector can contribute to climate-resilient 
development, are causing delays.
2: Extended Bio gas programme (MDB: 
World Bank)
The World Bank is channelling around US$10 million of 
SREP financing to scale up municipal waste-to-energy 
by covering initial costs and removing credit barriers. 
Financing and advisory support will help establish 
around 160, 000 biogas plants. The programme 
expects to leverage around US$126.4 million from 
private sector and development actors. This investment 
project was initially designed to support small-scale 
household biogas. Now it is being implemented, it 
is focusing on more viable opportunities such as 
community installations in schools and hospitals, and 
commercial or industrial situations. Most recently the 
project is being discussed for replacement by a grid tied 
solar project.
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Investment project 3: Mini micro off grid 
electricity (MDB: ADB)
SREP aims to provide affordable energy access to 
Nepal’s rural populations by allocating US$12 million 
to build 30MW capacity of mini micro hydropower 
installations and solar home systems. The implementing 
MDB (ADB) also expects to leverage around US$131 
million in additional financing from other actors such 
as the private sector, government and development 
partners (CIF, 2012a). 
Capacity building
Across all three investment projects SREP will support 
capacity building in renewable technologies by:
• Building commercial banks’ capacities to invest 
in renewable energy using different financing 
instruments
• Raising awareness and experience in local financial 
institutions and banks so they extend lending to SMEs 
in renewable technologies, and
• Enhancing local government capacities in 
decentralised renewable energy delivery. 
Drivers for investment priorities
• Investment in proven technologies: Nepal 
identified sectors which were sufficiently proven 
to scale up. The country has long experience with 
small and micro hydropower installations. Wind is a 
relatively new technology in Nepal, so wasn’t selected 
as a major priority. Nepal’s approach is that the 
incremental use of proven renewable technologies 
will have a transformational change on its economy 
and livelihoods (Rai, 2013b). These objectives also 
align with Nepal’s National Rural Renewable Energy 
Programme (NRREP) and the Rural Renewable 
Energy Policy 2006. This will also allow Nepal to 
harness its existing institutional arrangement at 
AEPC. However, within the mini-micro solar hybrid 
investment, wind energy has recently been included 
through potential loans from ADB. Although AEPC 
was mainly interested in solar and micro hydro, ADB 
has emphasised wind. ADB has a pilot wind power 
that it wanted to scale. Nepal also has strong potential 
for wind energy but not much has been done so far. 
Technology transfer from abroad could position Nepal 
to harness its wind potential. However, implementation 
of these loans is still pending due to issues over loan 
component that ADB wants to put in SREP. As per 
a cabinet decision by goN, Nepal has agreed not 
to borrow loans for investment in climate change 
relevant activities. 
• Investment in energy for productive uses: 
Investment in energy for productive uses was one 
of the selection criteria for SREP projects. During 
the initial prioritisation stages government favoured 
domestic level biogas, improved cook stoves and 
solar home systems. However, such technologies 
have received government support since the 
1990s and was therefore not considered innovative 
and transformational. As a result, MDBs and the 
government thought of scaling up investment in 
technologies that the country has less experience in, 
such as converting municipal waste into electricity 
and mini grid solar power, particularly for productive 
purposes (Rai et al., 2013). Energy for productive 
uses (for example institutional and community 
biogas or mini-micro hydro) is also expected to help 
businesses in marginalised areas and encourage 
migrants to return and set up enterprises. 
• Investment in commercially viable technology 
to attract private sector involvement: The 
commercial viability of proven grid-based technologies 
is the primary driver for selecting small hydropower 
as a demonstration project for catalysing private 
sector engagement. 
Concerns around prioritisation and 
implementation
• Investment in large scale waste to energy 
technology: A transition from household to extended 
waste-to-energy technology was considered 
necessary to test new technologies, diversify 
renewable sources and enable technology transfer 
from neighbouring countries. However, Nepal’s 
government and AEPC expressed concerns over 
government and municipal authorities’ capacity to 
implement this project and also the lack of evidence 
that this technology has proven successful in 
neighbouring countries. 
• Government preference for conventional hydro 
power: Nepal’s government has a strong policy 
to engage the private sector in hydropower. Yet 
hydropower has not been exploited to the fullest. In 
such conditions hydropower was considered to be 
higher priority rather than municipal waste.
• Investment in hydropower is not 
transformational: Development partners expressed 
concern around the transformational potential of 50 
MW of energy from small hydropower, when country’s 
energy needs are exceptionally high. 
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• Extension of loans for low carbon technology: 
The ADB’s preference to use loans for expanding the 
solar wind hybrid technology conflicts with a cabinet 
decision not to accept loans for climate relevant 
interventions, causing delays in implementation. 
• Alignment between MDB objectives and the 
national umbrella programme: Nepal’s National 
Rural Renewable Energy Programme is a single 
umbrella framework for renewable energy, funded by 
various donors through a joint financing mechanism. 
The programme follows a subsidy model where 40 
per cent of the subsidy comes from the government. 
out of a total pool of US$200 million, 35 per cent 
of the fund is government funded. The government 
expects SREP investments to rest within the NRREP 
framework. The MDBs are less approving of a subsidy 
based model and would likely prefer the phase out 
of subsidies. 
Coordination within government: Delivery of 
renewable energy projects is distributed between 
the ministries of energy and environment (through 
AEPC). AEPC delivers alternative energy projects 
up to 10MW while the Ministry of Energy manages 
renewable energy generation above 10MW. Although 
the Ministry of Energy is responsible for the SREP small 
hydro component, its direct role in implementation and 
delivery has remained limited. As projects move from 
planning to implementation it could be worth investing 
in coordination with MoE as it largely manages the grid-
based system within Nepal.
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Acronyms
ADB  Asian Development Bank
AfDB African Development Bank
AEPC Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (Nepal)
BFRI Bangladesh Forestry Research Institute
BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board
BCCSAP  Bangladesh Climate Change Strategic Action Plan
CEIP Coastal Embankments Improvement and Afforestation Programme (Bangladesh)
CREF Central Renewable Energy Fund (Nepal)
CREF Facility Climate Resilient green Economy Facility, Ethiopia
CIF  Climate Investment Funds
CTF Clean Technology Fund
DHM Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (Nepal)
DPHE  Department of Public Health and Engineering (Bangladesh)
DSCWM  Department of Soil Conservation and Water Management (Nepal)
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EEPCo  Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation
EPA Environment Protection Agency
FIP Forest Investment Programme
gEF global Environmental Facility
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IFC International Finance Corporation
IBRD  International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
LCRD  Low-carbon resilient development
LgED Local government Engineering Department (Bangladesh)
MDBs  Multilateral Development Banks
MoSTE  Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (Nepal)
MoFED  Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoWE Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy (Ethiopia)
MoM Ministry of Mines (Ethiopia)
NAPA  National Adaptation Program of Action
NRREP  National Rural Renewable Energy Programme (Nepal)
PPCR  Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
RREP  Nepal’s Rural Renewable Energy Programme
SCF  Strategic Climate Fund
SPCR  Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience
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